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Full text of "Russia & democracy: the German canker in Russia, with a pref. by Henry Cust. Pub. for the Central Committee for National Patriotic Organizations"

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I. From the Foundation of the Russian State to 
THE Accession of Peter the Great (a.d. 862- 

JL \J\j^ I ••• ■«• ••• ••• •■■ ••• 

II. Peter the Great (1682-1725) 

III. From Peter the Great to Catherine the 

Great (1725-1762) 

IV. Catherine the Great {1762-1796) 


r VI. Nicholas I. (1825-1855) 
VII. Alexander II. {1855-1881) 
VIII. Alexander III. (1S81-1894) 

IX) The Present Reign : Period of Conservatism 

X. Period of Progress (1905-1915) ... 

XI. Recapitulation and Conclusions 


X^ iJXH^A ••• •■• ••■ ••« 




V. Paul I. (1796-1801) ; Alexander I. (1S01-1S25) 20 







The enlightenment of war may be counted among the very 
few advantages war brings to man. War strips bare and 
illuminates what peace disguises and huddles away. And this 
is true not only of men and nations, but of attitudes of mind 
and trends of thought and policy, of which, after dim movings 
and retumings, appearances and vanishings, the long results 
stand suddenly apart and clear ; unexpected, but, it seems, 
inevitable. Things futile and fortuitous are seen as ordered 
processes ; and the unmeaning takes on significance. This war 
has already left many men and nations mother-naked, and 
later has exposed, for good or for bad, the very nerves of their 
spines and the convolutions of their brains. The world went 
traveUing a year ago, and discovered Germany, France and 
England, nations hitherto unknown ; discovered them equipped 
with a psychology, histology, pathology, &c., undreamed-of 
by the newest science. But, in judging Russia, who was also 
girding her loins, men were the more perplexed, because their 
means of diagnosis, especially of political diagnosis, were scant 
and faulty. Here was a state of mind which seemed of sudden 
birth ; an impulse, a conviction, a unity, a faith ; a creed, un- 
preached, unformulated, and yet of perfervid and overmastering 
vehemence. Whence grew the flame and whither was its blasting 
heat directed ? 

We have heard much of Russia in the last thirty years, but 
in the main of modem Russia only. Of old Russia, the Russia 
of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, where the roots of Russia 
lie deep, there is little reading to-day. Alexander Gwagninus 
and Paulus Oderbomius we may reasonably leave unopened. 


Even Samuel Purchas found in them nothing but " huskes, 
shels and rumours." But the close-packed stories of Giles 
Fletcher and Sir Jerome Horsey, ambassadors of Elizabeth to 
Ivan IV., and go-betweens in that astounding passage of love 
and commerce ; of Richard Chanceler, shipmate and co- 
adventurer of Sir Hugh Willoughby ; of George Turbervile, 
writer of verse ; of Anthony Jenkinson and of Robert Best ; 
of the Italians, Paolo Giovio, Contarini and Barbaro ; of the 
Germans, Sigismund von Herberstem and Olearius ; ending with 
the stately pages and glorious engravings of Comeille Le Brun ; 
all these paint us the Russian picture and the men who thought 
and wrought and fought within its frame, in a style of mingled 
breadth and detail which has lost nothing of freshness or 

Here are the blood and bones and body of the Russian 
stock from which derived, sequentially and logically, Orloff 
and Potemkin, Suvaroff and Koutousoff, Pushkin, Turgenieff, 
Tolstoy, and Dostoieffsky ; but \vith which half the famous 
names in later Russian history have nothing whatever to do. 
And it may well be that the stress that has been lately laid on 
Russian phenomena, some partly ahen, some wholly exotic, 
both in hterature and art, has led to a forgetfubess of the 
broad human foundation of the Russian people. 

The mighty revolution of Peter the Great made rather for 
division than for union among the Russians. That swashing 
blow at custom and tradition was too swift to be profound or 
abiding, and the Master's need for intelligent foreigners to 
execute his plans sowed germs of a disease which came near to 
suffocate the healthy national life he thought to establish. 
Russia was divided and in some sense has remained divided until 
to-day. There has been a Russia looking out of the window and a 
Russia inhabiting the house, but the face has not interpreted 
the body. It has given a false presentment of the truth behind 
it, and in it ahen blood has circulated. To shift tlie image, the 


stream of the people's life has flowed on and in time brought 
flower and fruit to birth, a generous harvest for the world to 
wonder at and seek to understand. The true character of the 
Russians silently enlarged and fixed its type. Late learners they 
were, but their character was founded deep in sheer simplicity 
and brought simplicity's attending dangers. For simplicity may 
most easily be led astray into the perverse paths of cunning and 
weakness, before it shall find at last its natural and inevitable 
heritage of sincerity and strength. Russia, half in blindness, 
half in compulsion, wandered under perfidious guidance from the 
way, and has to-day regained it. 

And so it is that you find the Russia of to-day as has been 
sketched above. For to-day Russia is getting rid of Germany. 
Two hundred years of tyranny, of suppression, of paralysis 
are being realised almost for the first time, and in that 
realisation are being swept away. Two long centuries of 
reaction, of intrigue, of exploitation, of perfidy, and of false 
sacrifice, are going up in gunpowder along the banks of the San. 
And millions of men feel a new hope in a new heart, and lift 
undazzled eyes to a dawn which they had grown at last to beUeve 
would never break. The mighty work of Peter is purged of the 
long slow poison it trailed in its traces, and Russia comes to ber 
own at last. And how this fell, this book is written to relate. 

For this is not a book on Russia. It is a closely knit political 
study of two hundred years of Russian history, in which a great 
people went near to ruin and has won through to power and great- 
ness, and, it may be hoped, to happiness such as it has never 
known. And the author is perhaps the most competent living man 
to write it. Of his perfect devotion to the cause of Anglo-Russian 
friendship I have had the fullest means of judging for near a 
quarter of a century'. Of his utter loyalty and integrity I have 
had the same experience. His personal acquaintance with 
Napoleon III. and Bismarck, to mention but two names, adds a 
quality of immediacy to his work. " No man perhaps has shown 


me more kindness," he wrote to me once, " than Prince Bismarck ; 
though no personal gratitude could prevail against national 
feeling. And his greatest act of kindness was the knowledge of 
the realities in politics, which I derived from discussing with him 
every possible eventuality. Of all my teachers I owe him most." 
And he added curiously, " My next greatest teacher was Leo 
XIII." In such a school of high poUcy, where action alternated 
with state-craft, M. de Wesselitsky won his fine international 
position. By his steadfast loyalty to the central idea of an Anglo- 
French-Russian Alliance, the old historic aim of Peter the 
Great, he earned and has retained the distinction of the cordial 
dislike and dread of Germany and Austria, in whose journals he 
is constantly abused. For this he has his reward to-day. 

As President for some fifteen years of the Foreign Press 
Association in London he has gathered fresh store of influence, 
respect and affection. England and Russia owe him much, and 
by this new and most original volume he adds to the debt. It 
is in the hope of obtaining yet larger recognition for such generous 
service that I have ventured at the wish of my friend to write 
this introduction. 

Henry Cust. 



Russians who reside in England are agreeably impressed 
by the fact that the English political world and English Society 
of to-day show cordial appreciation of the actual progress 
of Russia and of her culture in general. They are, moreover, 
deeply touched by the warm recognition of the efforts of 
Russia to do her duty by her Allies in the present war. The 
writer hears, however, that there are earnest and sincere men 
in this country and in the United States who think she is 
still the same Russia she was at the time of the Crimean 
War, and w^ho consider an alliance with her as incompatible 
with the struggle of Democracy against Military Despotism. 

We Russians can confidently leave to our English friends 
the task of clearing up those misunderstandings and of bringing 
home to the larger public an up-to-date knowledge of Russia 
as she really is. This is already being done very ably and 
consistently in articles and books on Russia, as well as in the 
daily communications of British correspondents in Russia. 
The above-mentioned objections, however, touch on a very 
important question on which it is well worth while to throw 
a clear and true light, particularly at the present moment, 



tSuberty^nT** '^'^^■> whetlicr there really exists an opposition between liberty 

demoeraty ? 

and democracy on one side and Russia on the other. An 
adequate answer to this question cannot be found in one stage 
or in one feature of Russian development. It must be sought 
in the whole course of her history, in her fundamental 
institutions, in her national life and character. 

G. DE W, 


From the Foundation of the Russian State to the 
Accession of Peter the Great (a.d. 862-1682). 

For many centuries preceding the foundation of the Russian ^°»j»i '**'°'^on 

..-».,.,. 11 ir • ii of the SI173 of 

State tlie Slavs of Russia hved in small, self-governing, mostly Russia 

agricultural communities, all members of which were free and 

equal ; they did not owe allegiance to feudal chiefs and waged 

no wars of plunder or of conquest. All their local affairs were 

decided, in towns, by the Vetche, and in villages, by the 

Mir, an assembly of heads of famihes. Only in vital matters 

the decision rested with the elders of the tribe. In the vast f^'^^p/tTeRoisian 

peas&ntry of 

Empire of Russia of to-day the great bulk of the population "^^^y 
is still living in villages with the same primeval Mirs. The 
life and character of the immense majority of the Russians 
can hardly be said to have essentially changed through all 
the evolutions of the Russian histor}'. Left to themselves, 
the Russians always reverted to the same kind of existence. 
The necessity of defending themselves against foreign 
aggression alone produced various superstructures over their 
primitive society. 

The appeal made to the Varanger princes was the first step "^^J^/^'^J^^, 

. , . ... leaderitilp of 

in the way of permanently securing the safety and indepen- ^;'^;;»°^*J>^ 
dence of the countr}". The state of the Russian Slavs was 
not, however, substantially altered thereby. National unity 
came to be represented by the Grand Duke, who, in reaUty, 



was only the first among other Princes, and these mostly were 
commanders of troops and chief magistrates in the local 
democracies. It was under the nominal rule of Princes that 
Novgorod and Pskov grew up as prosperous and powerful 
The Mongol yoke The Mougol yoke first introduced the conception, till then 

and absolute 

power. utterly unknown to the Russians, of an absolute power as an 

omnipotent, all-overwhelming force to which obedience was 
irresistibly due. The Grand Dukes of Moscow, as vassals and 
representatives of the Great Khans, claimed to exercise the 
fulness of the authority belonging to their suzerains. At the 
same time they assumed the part of intercessors for, and 
defenders of, the people. The marriage of the first independent 
Sovereign of Russia, Ivan III., with a Palaeologus, connecting 
the 'Russian monarchy with the Byzantine tradition, bestowed 
on it a historic legitimacy, while the sanction of the Church 
endowed it with a sacred character. The title of Tsar assumed 
by Ivan IV. gave a full expression to that evolution. 

LimitationB of For a long time, however, the autocracy of the Tsars existed 

absolutism by the 

Sfs°t^?acy in principle rather than in reality. Representatives of the 

people used to be called together in diflerent principahties 
before the Mongol invasion ; this habit was preserved and 
extended during the Moscow period, and the Zemsky Sabors 
became a national institution. They were mostly convened in 
great emergencies and a more direct influence was exercised 
by a permanent council, the Boyarskaya Douma, a stronghold 

* The progress of civilization brought about in large cities marked 
differences in fortune and position which led to the rise of ancient and 
wealthy families who strove for influence; yet on the whole, the political 
and social organization of Russia before the Moscow period remained 
decidedly democratic. 


of the Muscovite aristocracy which grew up simultaneous!}' 
with the growth of the monarchy.* 

Thus Russia, after having, in striking contrast with Western S^maMM"""*' 

Emigration and 

Europe, been from time immemorial a pure democracy, began c°<^MkR°pubUM. 

in the fifteenth century to resemble in political institutions 

and social organizations West-European countries. But, 

however necessary this new regime may have been for her 

national development in that period, it was too uncongenial 

to her profoundly democratic people. Many Russians, rather 

than submit to it, preferred leaving the Russia of those days ; 

and these emigrants founded, in lands inhabited by or exposed 

to the invasion of Tartar peoples, the military democratic 

republics of the Cossacks of the Dnieper, the Don, the Volga, 

the Yayik (Oural), and the Terek. 

In their struggles with the boyars the Tsars leant on the 
other classes, and the stronger-willed among them showed 
great sohcitude for the welfare of the people at large. Ivan the 
Terrible, who was trying to crush the boyars completely, not 
only convened the Zemsky Sabors, but allowed elected repre- 
sentatives of the middle and lower classes a share in juridical 
functions and administrative duties. He granted also charters 
of self-government to many peasant communities. Notwith- 
standing the outbursts of his wrath directed against the boyars, 

* When Moscow became the centre of national life, wealthy and 
influential personages from all parts of Russia, accompanied by numerous 
followers, began to gather there, entering the service of the rulers of 
Moscow and actively working for the unification of Russia. The position 
of the boyars (lords) of Moscow was raised thereby to a high eminence, 
still more increased by their being also joined by princes, descendants 
of Rurik, who had lost their princijialities and were content to become 
Moscow boyars, retaining only their princel}' title. This aristocracy 
differed, however, from West European in being dependent on 
service to the State, and not on feudal or territorial position. 


but reaching occasionally whole towns or provinces, he greatly 

contributed to the growth in the imagination of the masses 

Popular ideal of » of the ideal of a Peoole's Tsar. On the contrary, rulers weak 

Petpie'B Tsar. ^ -' 

in character or in their position invariably fell under the 
influence of the aristocracy. Boris Godounoff, who, owing to 
the circumstances of his accession, needed particularly the 
support of the upper classes, forbade free labourers to leave 
on or about St. George's day the estates they were cultivating, 
as was customary in Russia, thus converting them virtually 
lEtroooction of luto scrfs. This act, depriving the mass of the people of 

utrJdom. War of r a r r 

the ^p^ireiffse"'* personal freedom which, unlike the people of Western Europe, 

under the banner 

L"cnf«*^** it had always enjoyed, led naturally to a tremendous political 
and social upheaval ; one false Dimitri after another, 
personifying in the eyes of the masses a legitimate as well 
as a popular Tsar, found strenuous partisans, particularly 
amongst the peasants and the Cossacks. 

While the boyars were intriguing for personal advantage 
even with foreign enemies the gentry and the upper middle 
class, animated with ardent patriotism, saved the independence 
of Russia and put an end to anarchy by electing as Tsar a 
scion of the universally popular house of the Romanoffs. The 
rulers of that dynasty had decided popular sympathies and 
recognized the need of reforms ; their intentions, however, 
were paralyzed by more or less disguised opposition on the 
part of the boyars. 


Peter the Great (1682-1725). 

Peter the Great,* whose gigantic personality seems to have f.'ll]^^^?.""^'' 
equalled in strength and energy the whole French Convention, 
broke down the boyardom, utterly destroying Russian 
aristocracy, completely subjected the Church of Russia to the 
State, and, for the first time in Russia, rendered monarchy 
really absolute. Moreover, under the name of " Reform " 
he undertook to revolutionize the entire political and social 
organization as well as the whole national life of Russia. 
It appears probable, however, that he looked on absolute ^^l^l^l^^°^i^^_ 

* Peter the Great was the last Russian Sovereign -whose official 
title was " Tsar of Russia." At the request of the " Governing Senate," 
he adopted, November 2, 1721, the title of "Emperor of Russia" 
which has gradually, in special clauses of international treaties, been 
recognized by all Powers. In this way only can a Russian Sovereign 
be officially addressed. 

Ever since, all educated Russians have always spoken of their 
Sovereign, in a foreign language, as " the Emperor" and m Russian as 
" Gosouday Imperatoy" or simply " Gosoudar'' (Sire). The title 
" Tsar" is still greatly used by the peasants, who likewise use the word 
" Gosoudar." It is also often used in historical works, in oratory and in 

In Western Europe diplomatists, particularly those who have been in 
Petrograd, generally use the official appellation of " Emperor of 
Russia," while with the public the former title, "the Tsar," still mostly 
prevails, meaning exclusively " Emperor of Russia " ; strictly speaking 
it is no longer correct, for the Bulgarian Sovereign bears the title of 
" Tsar of the Bulgarians." 

Since Alexander I. all Imperial Manifestoes are issued in the name 
of " Emperor of Russia, Tsar of Poland, Grand-Duke of Finland." 



change of the 
forms of life. 

power as a temporaty dictatorship necessary for the 
establishment of the new order of things, destined to 
assure to Russia her natural place among the Nations. 
He gave a strong organization and extensive rights to the 
Senate, which he called "governing" to emphasize its sharing 
with the Sovereign in the government of Russia. A law 
passed at the end of his reign, but never applied by his 
successors, provided for the election of two members for each 
province who were also to sit in the Senate, And he took up 
again Ivan IV.'s democratic reforms, giving the people a share 
in provincial and municipal administration. He also opened up 
all careers to men of all classes. A man's advancement was in 
future not to depend on the mere accident of his birth, but on 
the value of his services to the State. 

This last measure certainly was in the interest of democracy, 
but its benefit, like that of all of Peter the Great's measures, 
was vitiated by the obligation for the servants of the State 
Opposition of tho to adopt West European dress and manners. As the great 

great majority of '^ -"^ ° 

majority of the Russians, viz., all peasants and most towns- 
folk, rigidly kept to the traditional customs and national 
way of hving, only a small, passively obedient minority, the 
new Noblesse, took interest in the State as its governing 
class ; the rest of the population were mere taxpayers and 
Eiftinth»Eo33ian subjccts. Mauy of them, distrusting a Church in subjection 
to civil power, joined the Raskol (Dissent), which then became 
a form of the national protest against the forced introduction 
of foreign ways. A rift was thus created in the Russian nation 
which is only now being filled up. 

The greatest ruler of Russia remained unbeloved by his 
people during his life, and the utihty of his "Reform" never 
ceased to be a matter of discussion. To its artificial character 


are attributed most of the unwelcome sides of the development 
of Russia during the last two centuries. The worst consequence 
of the " Reform " was that fatal separation of the new 
bureaucratic Noblesse from the mass of the people which per- 
mitted the domination of the Russian State by a foreign 

Peter the Great's foreign policy was, on the contrary, quite 
in the national interest, both in what he achieved — the opening 
up of a window into Europe — as well as in what he attempted, 
the liberation of Eastern Christians and the alliance of Russia 
with France and England. In 1698 he clearly saw the necessity U^" °o-r°^"" 

. lA-ii 1 Alliance. 

of what has been achieved only m 1914 ! And he was not less 
wise in his policy towards Germany, that of protecting her 
minor States against the ambitions of Austria and of Prussia. 



From Peter the Great to Catherine the Great 


Peter's immediate successors unfortunately exaggerated the 
wrong sides of his home programme, and totally upset his 
foreign one. The direction of the whole military and 
administrative machine became concentrated in St. Peters- 
burg, the new capital situated at the extremity and almost out 
of the Empire — imagine the capital of Great Britain at Land's 
HujEia roied ty jo this placc soou strcamcd a mass of adventurous foreigners 

cosmcpohtan a ^ 

coterie regardleu ■,■,-, • i r n • t 

oftbewiah.Bof ^vho settled there as in a colony of their own, spreading a 

the i.ation. -' ' jr t-> 

foreign atmosphere round an already almost denationalized 
government. So, as a natural result, the Government ruled 
Russia from the new capital without any consideration for 
the needs and wishes of the people, guided merely by the private 
interest of the momentary holders of power, and sometimes 
even by their enthusiastic devotion to the interests of a foreign 

They were enabled so to act owing to the indifference of 
the masses who regarded the "reformed" State as unholy, 
and limited their relations with it to a sullen obedience to all 
its commands which could not be eluded. The new Noblesse, 
unsupported by the people, was of necessity subservient to the 
Court and particularly to the dominant faction of the moment. 


Only in one instance did the democratic spirit of the nation j 

show itself even in " reformed " Russians. When the St. j 

Petersburg government, in imitation of Prussia, tried to create j 

a class of large landowners on the basis of the right of i 

primogeniture, and enacted a law according to which a man's ] 

whole estate passed to his eldest son, the Russian Noblesse * 

never applied it and persistently demanded its abolition until 
the government saw itself compelled to give way on that point 
to a feeling which was quite unanimous. 

The great Peter, in revolutionizing the whole structure of 
Russian life, needed above all clever and precise men to carry 
out his will unhampered by any connection with the order of 
things he was resolved to destroy. He found them at first 
chiefly in foreigners and, after the conquest of Esthonia and 
Livonia, availed himself particularly of the services of the 
German barons of those provinces who were accustomed from ^J^"^'''"'' "' 


their birth to rule over a subject race. He never meant to bestow 
on them any privileges over Russians, and was making hasty 
efforts so that Russians might acquire in great Western centres 
all the knowledge he wished to see applied to Russia. Nothing 
could have been further from Peter's thoughts than granting 
to foreigners, and least of all to Germans, a predominant 
position in the Empire. Notwithstanding this, various factors 
inevitably led exactly to such a result. 

Intermarriages with members of German dynasties brought ^Ji^rincelsM' 
to St. Petersburg German princes and princesses with their 
suites, and gave to a great extent a German character to the 
Russian Court. Many of the Baltic barons settled likewise 
in the capital of the Empire which they considered themselves 
to be called upon to rule. Thither flocked from all parts of 
Germany men whose title to nobility was small or doubtful ; 

German immi- 
grants of tbe 
upper and middle 


many of them, even, were but simple adventurers. They were 
attracted by the great resources of Russia which an almost 
German Court held at its disposal, and they often obtained 
most unexpected prizes. 

Members of German learned and teaching professions, 
following in the wake of princes and nobles, came to Russia 
and acquired highly privileged positions. The Russian Academy 
of Sciences became a German institution, so much so that, 
up to quite lately, it published its works in German. It never 
concealed its hostility towards Russian scientists, and boy- 
cotted the most eminent among them. It refused admittance 
in its midst even to Mendeleyeff. When the latter came to 
Oxford in 1894 to receive the highest honours from the 
University of Oxford, he was there often referred to as a 
Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. On one occasion 
he told the writer (who accompanied him there) that, as a matter 
of fact, it was the only academy in Europe of which he was 
not a member. The favour shown to Gemian schools in Russia, 
and their growing prosperity, for a long time contrasted 
strongly with the many restrictions placed on Russian schools, 
and tlie very scanty funds which the Russian Exchequer, 
up to the present reign, found possible to devote to them, 
oiraans'to' ^^ would be too long to enumerate all the privileges enjoyed 

by Germans in every profession and trade in Russia, many of 
which were still preserved till the outbreak of the present war. 
Some are continued even at this day. As a remarkable example 
of them the following may be quoted. The writer, when 
residing in Germany in the eighties, witnessed the universal 
outburst of indignation there on account of Russian Jews 
having petitioned the Russian Government for permission to 
own chemists' stores in St. Petersburg, then an exclusive 



privilege of Germans. German writers and speakers appealed 
to the Jews of Germany to require from their co-religionists in 
Russia that they should abstain from such a "revolting" 
attack on the " rightful " possessions of Germans in Russia. 

The influx of Germans was so great that, in consequence of 
intermarriages with them, a considerable part of the Russian 
Noblesse had German blood in their veins. And the same was 
the case with the Russian intelligentzia and the upper middle 
class in St. Petersburg. If the language of the cosmopolitan 
society in the new capital did not become German, it was 
chiefly due to the fact that the German princes and nobles 
of the eighteenth century spoke French among themselves. 
With them, however, even a foreign language served as a 
vehicle for national thoughts, while the adoption of it by the 
Russian ruling class consummated their denationalization. 
Acquaintance with French literature inspired, in truth, in 
many Russians interest in and sympathy with France, but 
did not exercise any influence on the policy of Russia, the 
Court and Government remaining more or less greatly 
Germanized. The use of a foreign language in society and at 
home by all families of distinction, or pretending to be such, 
had the effect of widening more than anything the gulf between 
the rulers and the ruled. Foreign observers, even so late as the 
end of the last century, noted with amazement that, in 
administrative departments and other public institutions, 
courteous attention was paid to all foreigners, as well as to 
Russians who spoke a foreign language, while those who spoke 
the language of the country were treated with contempt. 

While society was becoming cosmopolitan, the Court and Ge"rm'anJ"b«o''mM 

,., ii'i 1 • • » Oernimlc power 

diplomacy, the army and higher administration grew more "Yu^lf"^" 
and more to be a private domain of the Germans. They were 



German terror. 

Btisslan reaction 
under Elizabeth. 

filling up all the most important and advantageous posts, 
and always pushed forward other Germans who received every 
preference over Russians. Ruled thus by the Germans, the 
Russian Empire was practically a Germanic Power whose 
forces were principally employed to serve Germany and 
Germanism. And the German yoke proved to be harder and 
more deeply harmful than the Mongol. 

It reached its chmax when the Empress Anna (1730-1740) 
entrusted with absolute power her German favourite, Biron, 
who introduced a regime of terror against all Russians 
suspected of disliking German rule. He created a special 
inquisition, invented tortures, and was the first to make 
extensive use of banishment to Siberia. 

It was enough to bear the reputation of being independent 
in character or of having national Russian feelings to ensure 
becoming a prey to the spies and agents of the Teuton tyrant. 
The meekness with which the Russians submitted to an anti- 
national persecution in their own country can be understood 
only by remembering that it was exercised chiefly on a 
denationalized class who had lost the confidence of the people, 
who did not see much difference between being oppressed by 
foreigners or by their own estranged countrymen. 

There was a kind of reaction against the exclusive 
domination of the Germans under the Empress Elizabeth 
(1741-1762),* but it was only a superficial one. The persecution 
of Russians as such ceased ; and they were again admitted 
to higher posts in the administration. But no serious measures 
were taken to dislodge the Germans from the many privileged 

* Elizabeth died on December 25, 1761(0.3.) .which in the iSth century- 
corresponded to January 5, 1762 (n.s.). 


positions they had possessed themselves of, or to counter- ] 

balance their influence at Court and in the government. j 

Russia's foreign policy continued to be determined by one of | 


the two rival German factions at Court, one Austrian, the other j 

Prussian. Elizabeth favoured the former and made war on ' 

Frederick 11. The St. Petersburg Germans, who already saw :i 

in that King the restorer of the ancient power of Germany, , 

were entirely for Prussia. They were gathered round I 

Elizabeth's heir, the Duke of Holstein, a German in his I 

feelings and an enthusiastic admirer of Frederick, who openlj^ 
declared he valued his commission in the Prussian Army 
higher than the Imperial Crown of Russia. On ascending the Eoandiesadivo- 

<~> ir o tion of Peter lO. 

throne as Peter III. (1762) he immediately gave back to rTu^u*""" 
Frederick II. East Prussia, Brandenburg and Pomerania, 
which had been conquered by the Russian Army, then 
occupying Berlin. He did not ask for any compensation or 
guarantee for the future, and even placed his army in Prussia 
under the command of Frederick. The latter recognized that 
he had been saved by Russia from utter destruction, but 
showed his gratitude in his own way. Before even the end 
of the Seven Years' War he sent emissaries to instigate the 
Khan of the Crimea to invade Russia. 



Catherine the Great (1762-1796). 

Russiiin national 
r»viv»l oiideT 

Her liberal 
reform B. 

Catherine II. 's reign constituted a more serious anti- 
German reaction. Russia's foreign policy became as a rule 
independent of the Germanic Cabinets and pursued purely 
Russian aims. The recovery of the shores of the Black Sea 
was an historical achievement as essential to tlie existence 
of the Russian Empire as was that of the shores of the Baltic. 
In the Army and the administration Germans were no longer 
favoured at the expense of Russians ; the foremost generals 
and statesmen of Catherine bore Russian names. She won 
the enthusiastic loyalty of the Noblesse, which in her reign 
ceased to be mere bureaucracy. She extended the privileges 
granted by Peter III. in the Charter of the Noblesse. The 
nobles were given a certain share in the management of local 
affairs in the provinces. Provincial and district assemblies of 
the Noblesse were the first deliberative bodies of the reforaied 
Russia ; their presidents, the Marshals of the Noblesse, 
were the first elective, non-bureaucratic, high functionaries 
of the Empire. Catherine gave also municipal self-government 
to larger cities. She went even much farther. Under the name 
of the " Commission for the framing of laws," she convened 
an assembly elected in tlie whole Empire in which all classes 
were represented. Tliat assembly met in 1767, twenty-two 
years earlier than the French States-General convened by 

influenced by 
Oennau ld*a«. 


Louis XVI. It was not, however, given to the " Commission " 
to become a starting-point of the constitutional development 
of Russia. The spirit of independence evinced by its members 
impressed courtiers and bureaucrats as being dangerous to 
their privileges. Under their influence, Catherine, though 
she largely availed herself of the legislative work of the Com- 
mission, never summoned it again. 

Russian writers, comparing Catherine's reign with those ^'°^* 
of her predecessors as well as of her successors, regard it as 
an era of national revival. This is, on the whole, true. 
Catherine consistently strove to feel and to act as a Russian, 
though she was not altogether free from the influence of her 
German blood and education. In spite of her relations with 
French philosophers, she was, in her inner pohcy, mostly 
carrjdng out German ideas. Her constitution of the Noblesse 
as a class of privileged landowners was an imitation of the 
Prussian " Adelstand " ; and the Assemblies of the Noblesse 
were copied from the " Landtage," The organization of the 
trades' corporations and of the municipal administration 
was also on German Hues. 

She had a clear perception of the necessity of emancipating 
the serfs, yet she did not attempt to carry it through. As 
she owed her throne to her popularity with the Noblesse, and 
particularly the ofhcers of the Guards, on whose further 
support she rehed, Catherine could hardly undertake against 
the wishes of the nobles a reform so deeply affecting their 

Not only did she not abolish serfdom, but she even extended ca'i.rin. tn»aca. 

ratal Odrman 

it to parts of Russia where it was not known. The result was soMia. 
similar to that of the introduction of serfdom by Boris 
Godounoff — a terrible insurrection in which peasants and 



Cossacks thronged to the banner of a false Peter III., in whom 
they once more imagined they saw the incarnation of their 
old dream of a People's Tsar. 

Wliile the position of the Russian agriculturists was 
rendered still harder, favours were lavished on German 
colonists called in by Catherine to settle in Russia. Every 
one of them received 60 dessiaiines (about 160 acres) of the 
best land, and every colony large pasture grounds and woods. 
They were, moreover, exempted from all taxes and duties, 
even from military service, and were granted complete 
self-government. Absolutely useless to Russia, those colonies 
formed advance guards of the German Drang nach Osfen. 
toTmortraui'^"^ The most fatal instance of the German influence on 

oonacqaence of 

GermttE uitceoee. Catherine's policy was her listening to Frederick's proposals 
concerning Poland and her consenting to its partition. It is 
true she annexed provinces originally Russian and mostly 
inhabited by Russians. Nevertheless, the participation of 
Russia in an act of unjustifiable violence against a Slavic 
Kingdom bound more strongly than anything the policy of 
Russia to that of Prussia and Austria. Every time that Russia 
appeared inclined to form friendships with Western Powers, 
the Germanic Cabinets appealed to the solidarity among the 
three partitioning States. They even arrogated to themselves 
the right to object to any treatment of the Russian Poles wliich 
might encourage their national aspirations. No other act 
of the St. Petersburg government proved more helpful to 
Germany and more detrimental to Russia. 

S^to^eT^biem Catherine's wars with the Turks produced quite a different 

«.nd the people In 

tji.e^tr»g«i« fo. un ^ffect. They not only secured for Russia her natural frontiers 
in the South, but also gave her the right to protect the 
Eastern Christians wliich equally gratified the sentiments of 


both the westernized Noblesse and of the masses faithful to 
the ancient Muscovite regime. These saw in the struggle 
against Infidels a defence of their own faith and a liberation 
of their co-religionists. These campaigns were the first action 
of the reformed State which the people could understand and 
sympathize with. They opened the series of Russian Crusades, 
and began to unite the severed parts of the nation in fighting 
for the same ideal, 

Catherine systematically encouraged Russian language and 
literature, stimulated Russian national feeling and mani- 
fested her pride in being a Russian Sovereign. Of all the 
reigns of the St. Petersburg period hers was the most liberal 
up to that of Alexander II. and the most national up to that 
of Alexander III, Above all she knew how to inspire daring 
enterprise, persistent efforts and boundless devotion to the 
throne and the country, which led to feats of heroism and self- 
sacrifice filling the Russians with confidence in their own 
£mpire and nationahty. 



Paul I. (1796-1801) ; Alexander I (1801-1825). 

Oerman domiaa- 
tioa restored 

Alexander I. '3 
policy determined 
by lu« predilection 
for Germany and 
friendship with 
tae SovereigDi of 

Catherine the Great seemed to have clearly traced for her 
successors the main lines of their right policy. The fact is 
the more astonishing that they adopted just the reverse. 
Her death was immediately followed by the restoration of 
the German domination over Russia, not in sooth in the crude 
form of Biron's tyranny, but in a more subtle one, penetrating 
the Russian State deeper than ever before, and determining 
the whole foreign policy of Russia for ninety-five years, from 
the accession of Paul I. to the conclusion of the Franco- 
Russian Alliance by Alexander IH. 

Paul I.'s reign was particularly remarkable for its tendency 
to reverse whatever had been done under Catherine. The hopes 
of Russian Liberals were set on his heir, who appeared to be 
destined, not only to continue Catherine's refomis, but also 
to satisfy the aspirations of all lovers of progress. Cautious 
men even apprehended the radicalism of a revolutionary's 
pupil.* In the opinion of the talented historian who threw 
more light than any other on Alexander I.'s personaHty 
(the Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovitch), he was a great ruler,, 
but not for Russia. Most unfortunately he neither under- 
stood Russia, nor hked anything Russian. And he had a strong 

• Alexander I.'s tutor was Laharpe, who afterwards, as a Jacobia 
Member of the French Convention, voted for the execution of Louis XVI. 



preference for everything German. Loving humanity above 
all, he saw its highest expression in Germany, by promoting 
whose interests he believed himself to be working for the 
greatest good of mankind. He was, besides, bound by ties of 
intimate friendship to King Frederick WiUiam III. and Queen 
Louisa of Prussia, the object of the one platonic affection of 
his life. The vows he exchanged with them were in his eyes 
more binding than his duty to his own country. The 
consequence of that state of mind were fatal to himself as well 
as to Russia. 

Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovitch, in publishing Alexander 
I.'s private correspondence with his sister and political 
confidant, the Grand Duchess Catherine, showed that at 
Tilsit Napoleon decided to wipe Prussia out of the number of ^= sacrif ce of 

^ •* e»sential interests 

J jr> trrtt-\'rtr' "' EtisEJa in order 

mdependent States and offered Russia for her frontier the to .ave pmsaa. 
line of the Vistula and that of the Danube. Alexander refused 
both ; the former because he wanted above all to preserve 
Prussia, and the latter on account of his promise to Prussia 
not to annex the Danubian countries. Napoleon consented, 
" out of regard for the wishes of the Emperor of Russia " 
to preserve the existence of Prussia, but was unable to under- 
stand a Sovereign caring more for the interests of a foreign 
country than his own. He, therefore, suspected Alexander 
of fundamental hostility against himself, and of deep designs 
against the French Empire. Their friendship was thus under- 
mined and a conflict became inevitable. Yet while Alexander 
was, for the love of Prussia, staking Russia's existence in the 
war with France, Frederick William, in letters full of most 
abject flattery and humility, was imploring Napoleon to give 
Prussia the Russian Baltic Provinces ! 

But even his friend's shameful betrayal had no power to 


change Alexander's heart. After expelling the French and 
their German Allies from Russia, he at once undertook a war 
for the liberation of Germany ; and at the Vienna Congress 
insisted above all on the aggrandisement of Prussia. Later 
on, he founded the Holj- Alliance, which practically amounted 
to Russia's assisting Pmssia and Austria in the satisfaction 
of their ambitions. 
iTe^Xr^re^'^" His predilcctiou for Germany and tlie Germans influenced 

U'lonces the idek 

o^StitutifD\a ^Iso the whole of Alexander's home policy. In the earUest 
years of his reign he was determined to grant a most Uberal 
constitution to Russia. A Committee of young men of his 
age enjoying his particular confidence sat under his presidency 
in the Winter Palace elaborating such a Constitution. As is 
seen from the journals of that Committee, the Emperor's great 
apprehension was the weakness of the future opposition. 
Early wars for the sake of his German friends, his absorbing 
interest in Prussia and the influence of his German advisers 
deterred him from giving a practical shape to the constitution. 
German-Russians shared most of the important posts in Russia 
with Prussians specially invited by Alexander I. The great 

brGeraa"?hf '" Prussian statesman. Stein, banished from Prussia on 

bigheat favour In 

Eumia. Napoleon's demand, exercised, as long as he stayed in Russia, 

a strong influence on Alexander's mind ; he was particularly 
instrumental in bringing about the war of 1812, To be a 
German, under Alexander I.'s reign, became more than ever 
the surest way to every honour and distinction. The famous 
general, Yermoloff, asked by the Emperor what reward he 
would like to receive for his great services, replied : — " To 
be promoted German ; rewards would then follow of them- 

Yet in one year of his reign Alexander I. showed himself 


at one with his people and worthy of his great talents. That 
was during Napoleon's invasion in 1812. Although almost 
all the States of Europe, England and Sweden excepted, 
sent their armies to join the French, and in spite of Napoleon's 
occupying Moscow, Alexander firmly refused all proposals 
of peace, and abode by his decision to fight on till the last 
enemy had left Russia. The desecration of Russian Churches 
and the destruction of Moscow moved the Russian people 
to the innermost depths of their hearts, and roused them to 
wonderful efforts which immensely contributed to the complete 
victory of Russia.* It was generally expected that after that 
war Alexander I.'s chief care would be to reward the Russian 
people for their sacrifices by granting them at last the free 
institutions he had been preparing for them, as well as by 
devoting all his thoughts to the welfare of Russia. 

Unfortunately he was again diverted from it by his solicitude 
for the cause of Germany and especially of Prussia ; and his 
German friends and advisers made ever}' effort to dissuade 
him from applying his Uberal principles to Russia proper. 
Yielding to their representations, he contented himself with lH'j;^^^'^ 

. . .... ... . ,,,-,. given to non- 

givmg free mstitutions to the frontier provmces of the Empire ^^^^"l^"^ 
inhabited by non-Russian populations. Out of the provinces 
conquered from Sweden, which under Swedish rule never had 
any autonomy, he created the Grand Duchy of Finland, 
gave it a liberal constitution,! and even annexed to it the 

* It is interesting to remember just now that the population of the 
invaded parts of Russia soon discovered the difference between " real 
French" soldiers and their German auxiliaries whose rapacity and 
cruelty knew no limits. 

t As a matter of fact, that constitution benefited chiefly the SwedLsh 
Noblesse which dominated Finland, and Swedish remained the only 
oflicial language there till Alexander II. 's reign. 


province of Vyborg, till then united to Russia, inhabited partly 
by Russians and situated almost at the gates of the Russian 
capital.* Out of the PoUsh provinces which the partition 
had given to Austria and Prussia, and of which Napoleon had 
formed the Duchy of Warsaw, Alexander created the kingdom 
of Poland and endowed it also with a liberal constitution, 
which, however, as the great majority of the people were serfs, 
gave citizen-rights to the Noblesse alone. He intended, more- 
over, to go much farther in alienating Russian territory, 
viz., annexing to Poland not only Lithuania, but also White 
Russia and Little Russia on the right bank of the Dnieper, 
which had belonged to Poland, although the Poles were in 
a small minority there. He renounced it only in consequence 
of a pressing appeal of the great Russian historian Karamzin, 
who persuaded him not to sacrifice to non-Russian minorities 
in those provinces the great bulk of their population, which 
was Russian in race, creed and traditions. The privileges of 
Esthonia, Livonia and Courland were also extended so as to 
assure them full autonomy. So the non-German natives were 
deUvered up to the tender mercies of their German oppressors. 
Alexander, it is true, emancipated the serfs there, but he allowed 
the barons such an influence on the framing of that measure 
that the liberated serfs were deprived of the land they had 
been cultivating and continued to be subjected to their 
masters, getting nothing of freedom except the naked name. 
European Liberals always warmly approved those acts of 
Alexander L and regretted that not all his intentions were 
carried out. They evidently were not aware that those rights 

* That act of Alexander I. inspired a writer in the Literary Supple- 
ment to the "Times" with the reflection that there would be few Irish 
home rulers in Great Britain if Ireland began in Surrey. 


and liberties benefited only small privileged minorities at the 

expense of the people at large. Alexander I.'s German advisers g^fj.^^f *?„°4,es 

. determined by 

inspired him with the anti-democratic theory that the nation- *!;\*^«^ 
ality of a country was to be determined by that of its Noblesse. 
They intimated, moreover, that provinces with strong 
aristocratic non-Russian elements ought to receive new 
privileges as a reward for furnishing the St. Petersburg govern- 
ment with able and devoted agents to assist them in main- 
taining their absolute rule over Russia proper. That alliance 
between the denationalized and greatly Germanized St. 
Petersburg bureaucracy and the non-Russian Noblesse 
against the Russian People has certainly escaped the attention 
of Western radicals and democrats who, under the influence 
of opinions " made in Germany," stood up for a policy directly 
opposed to their own fundamental principles. 

As to the Russians themselves, Alexander I. limited his The interests of 

' Uic Rn»sian 

.... , . 1-1 • -J. Rjajority sacrificed 

reforms to the creation of military colomes which, given into ^°*'^^^?^^ 
the charge of his all-powerful favourite, Araktcheyeff, became 
centres of intolerable oppression. Moreover, in the last years 
of liis reign, Alexander entrusted the latter with the exercise 
of an absolute power over all Russia which Araktcheyeff 
made use of so harshly and arbitrarily as almost to recall tlie 
tyranny of Biron. 

The Russian Liberals, at the head of whom, before his Th« rebeuion of 

December, IsZo 

accession and in the first years of his reign, stood no other 
than Alexander I. himself, could not help feeling deeply 
discouraged and embittered by the disappointment of their 
most cherished hopes. They formed secret societies and 
prepared a revolution, judging the propitious moment to be 
just after Alexander I.'s demise. Nicholas I. was hesitating 
to accept the crown bequeathed to him by Alexander I., 


passing over Nicholas' elder brother Constantine. The 
conspiracy, which spread into the Army, and the attempt 
at an open rebellion, undoubtedly deserve all blame. The 
programme of the Decembrists (so-called from the attempt 
being made in December, 1825, old style) was, however, 
incomparably more moderate than that of later revolution- 
aries. Its two chief points, emancipation of the serfs and 
national representation, now form an integral part of the legal 
state of Russia. 


Nicholas I. {1825-1855). 

Nicholas I. shared neither his predecessor's Uberal leanings mcb^i/, 
nor his exclusive devotion to Prussia. He put uppermost his themodaiof 
own duty to Russia and the interests of the Russian Empire. 
To his country's and his own misfortune, however, he too was 
influenced by German ways of thinking and by his admiration 
for the Prussian State. He considered his chief task was to 
give Russia the solid Prussian organization, with Prussian 
rigid disciphne and systematic order. Apparently not knowing 
or nnderstanding enough of his own people, he overlooked 
the discrepancy between the free and easy-going Russian 
national disposition and the Prusso-German methods which, 
excellent in their own place, were on the Russian soil quickly 
degenerating into soulless formalism. To govern Russia, for 
her own good, as if she were peopled by Germans, or as if 
Russians could be turned into Germans, was an undertaking 
necessarily doomed to failure. Its only effect was to regularize 
and morally Germanize the St. Petersburg bureaucracy, 
rendering it much more oppressive. 

Baltic and other Germans, who had been invading all 
services under Alexander I., increased still more in numbers ; 
they were considered as the firmest supporters of the throne, 
deserving greater confidence than the Russians on account 
of their presumed absolute loyalty and devotion to the 


dynasty, Pahlen's and Bennigsen's dastardly murder of 
Paul^I. was wilfully ignored and its very mention strictly 
prohibited. Nicholas I.'s belief in the superior moral worth 
of Germans was so strong that he quashed sentences of the 
Courts against those convicted for fraud because " they being 
Germans could not have committed such a thing." 
Sfe'^^i^'°°°' Of aU the services, the diplomatic was the most thoroughly 


denationalized and Germanized. That was at first the work 
of Alexander I. himself, carried on more consistently by Count 
Nesselrode, foreign minister during the latter part of Alexander 
I.'s reign, the whole of Nicholas I.'s and the first years of 
Alexander II. 's. Nesselrode, a German by birth who remained 
a German at heart, never even learned to speak Russian and 
knew nothing about Russia. The Russian language was 
consistently avoided in written as well as in verbal 
communications at the Russian Foreign Office. Even a Russian 
name and origin became a drawback in the diplomatic career 
and a cause for suspicion. This " Russian " diplomacy made a 
parade of its devotion to the interests of Europe and of the 
monarchical principle, while practically serving the aims of 
Austria or of Prussia. It was animated by intense hatred of 
Catherine's national Russian policy ; and one of its oracles. 
Baron Brunnow, in a Memorial destined to serve as a guide 
in the study of foreign politics of Nicholas I.'s heir (Alexander 
II.) subjected all the great achievements of Catherine to severe 
criticism ; her acting independently of Austria and Prussia 
appeared to liim as a betrayal of " Europe." That Memorial 
exercised an unwholesome influence on Alexander II. 's mind. 
In accordance with the opinion of Nicholas I. and that of the 
ruling class, no criticism of the German nation or of the Austrian 
or Prussian policy was tolerated ; not only in the Press, 


but even in works of history. Germany and Germanic 

States could only be referred to with unqualified praise as ; 

bulwarks of order and strongholds of the monarchical form I 

of government. j 

There existed, however, one question of foreign poUcy which 1 
irresistibly appealed to the feelings of all Russians and about 


which the " refomied" classes as well as the popular masses I 

were equally in earnest. This was the fate of the Eastern pouc^^'jfe.v ' 

Eaatem queatioD. ! 

Chnstians, whom everj' Russian thought it was Russia's : 

duty to protect and to liberate. And even the most > 

Germanophil rulers of Russia shared it themselves, and were i 

on that point, at least, more or less at one with their people. j 
German-Russians and the cosmopoUtan " Russian " diplomacy 

had, therefore, to bow down to the inevitable ; reserving to i 

themselves to limit, in practice, the working out of the policy 1 

imposed upon them. At the St. Petersburg Foreign Office, , 

the Asiatic Department, which included the European Near | 

East, differed from the rest in so far that the Russian language < 
and Russian thought were admitted there. And Russian 
Consuls in Turkey performed their duty of protecting Ottoman 
Christians with a devotion even to the sacrifice of their own 

lives. All the higher diplomatic posts, however, continued 1 


to be filled up by Germans or Germanized Russians. | 

The above explains the independence from German influences one daynTHpie 1 

EntenM. J 

shown by Nicholas I. in the course he adopted in favour of j 

revolted Greece. To the great anger of Vienna and Berlin he I 

brought about a rapprochement with England and France ; i 

a tentative Triple Entente, for a single day transformed into : 

an alliance, equally glorious for the three Navies, the day of \ 
Navarino (October 20, 1827). The Entente, however, broke 

down immediately afterwards ; England and France did not , 


see their way to joining Russia in the measures of coercion 
which she proposed to adopt against Turkey at the beginning 
of 1828.* Seeing Russia alone, the Porte refused all con- 
cessions and declared war on Russia, which nevertlieless 
persisted and, by dint of enormous sacrifices in men and 
money during a two years' war, succeeded in compelling 
the Porte, in the treaty of Adrianople (1829), to recognize the 
independence of Greece. The frontiers of the new State were 
determined by Russia, England and France in the London 
Protocol of Marcli 22, 1829. By the same treaty of Adrianople 
Russia secured autonomy for Moldavia, Wallachia and 
vSerbia, as well as a confirmation of Russia's right to protect 
the Christians of Turkey. 
^I^c'SSrtJhthe The French Revolution of 1830 and its echo, tlie Pohsh 

f-kroiaiilc powers. 

Rebellion, led to a new triumph of Germanism in Russia. 
Believing peace and order threatened by a new revolutionary 
wave, Nicholas I, renewed his alliance with the Vienna and 
Berlin Cabinets ; and Nesselrode had a free hand for modelling 
his action on that of Metternich. By an irony of Fate it is 
exactly in the thirties and forties of last century that Russian 
diplomatists earned the fame of great sagacity aild astuteness. 
As a matter of fact there were hardly any among them who 
thought or felt as Russians, and their "successes" did not 
benefit Russia, but rather Austria or Prussia. Their most 
brilliant achievement, the Quadruple Entente in the Egyptian 
question in 1840, which separated England from France and 

• The popular emotion produced in France by the devastatins; warfare 
of Ibrahim Pasha (Mehemet Ah's eldest son) in the Morea induced the 
French Government to send a corps of troops, uhich expelled the 
Egyptians from that peninsula and remained there without taking 
part in the hostilities against the Turkish army, till the end of the 
Russo-Turkish war. 


isolated the latter, furthered no interests of Russia, but only 
those of the Germanic States ; and it was paid for by the 
abandonment by Russia of the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi 
(1S33),* which had been the nearest approach to a solution 
peaceful and also satisfactory^ to Russia, of the question of 
the Dardanelles. 

It must be remembered to the eternal honour of Nicholas I. di^^°lt^o,tm»n 

states anti of tl t 

that, during the revolutionary period of 1848-1850, he supported ''^^■"" of power. 

Prussia provided only she respected treaties, and efficiently 

opposed her attempts to despoil Denmark of the Elbe Duchies 

and usurp a supremacy over minor German States. The 

Russian Baltic Fleet, acting together not only with the 

Swedish but also with that of the French Repubhc, compelled 

Prussia to evacuate Schleswig-Holstein and to give up her 

designs of conquest. He was not less firm in exacting from the 

King of Prussia the renunciation of the Imperial Crown of 

Germany, offered him by the Frankfort Parliament, and a 

return to the constitution of the Germanic Confederation. 

In both instances the autocratic Emperor acted as a guardian 

of the independence of small States, as well as of the balance 

of power in Europe. 

Nicholas I.'s most criticized act, and one of which he him- 
self bitterly repented afterwards, was his saving Austria from 
disruption by crushing tlie victorious insurrection in Hungary. 
Russia received no compensation whatever for her exertions 
and sacrifices, not even a war indemnity. An excellent 
opportunity was lost for putting an end to that ramshackle 

• That treaty was signed July 8, 1833, when at the request of 
Mahmoud 11., Russian troops were landed on the Asiatic side of the 
Bospborus to protect Constantinople against the advance of the Egyptian 
Army after Ibrahim-Pasha's victory over the Turks at Konieh. 


Empire, a private domain of the Hapsburgs who exploited 
and oppressed different nationalities, exciting them to strife 
against one another, and who were already planning to extend 
their sway over the Balkan Peoples liberated by Russia. To 
be quite fair to Nicholas I. we must add, however, that the 
Russian intervention saved the Croats and Serbs of Hungary 
from the war of extermination waged against them by the 

A combination of various causes, chief among which the 
over- rating in Western Europe of Russia's power of conquest 
and assimilation, as well as a total disregard of the national 
spirit of the Balkan Peoples, both secretly promoted by the 
diplomacy of Germanic Powers, brought about, at the end 
of Nicholas I.'s reign, a coalition against Russia. The war 
resulted, however, in the attainment of none of its objects. 
becwe^uR^'a England's trade with Russia passed into Germany's hands, 

and Western 

f°^ll' thT^x^ ^^'^ ^ d^sp estrangement was created between Russia, on one 

elusive friendship 

ofKussia. side, and England, France and Austria on the other, while 

Russo-Prussian friendship became closer than it had ever 
been. Prussia's conduct towards Russia differed from that of 
Austria in form and degree rather than in substance. Prussia 
made, in 1855, an alliance with Austria guaranteeing her 
territory against an attack of Russia. Thus Austria could 
invade Russia without any opposition from Prussia, but 
should Russia repulse that invasion and attempt to attack 
Austrian territory, Prussia would make a war on her. Con- 
sidering that Russia had saved Prussia, not once, but several 
times, from utter annihilation, her ingratitude was in no way 
less than that of Austria. Yet while Austrian leading states- 
men themselves declared tliey would astonish the World 
by their ingratitude, the Prussian Court and diplomacy 


knew how to represent their conduct as a new proof of their 
fidelity to their traditional friendship with Russia. They 
were promptly aided in deluding the Russian Court and 
Government by the German-Russian circles in St. Petersburg, 
supported by the whole St. Petersburg bureaucracy. The 
elimination of the Austrian diplomatic influence which, directed 
by Mettemich, had successfully rivalled that of Prussia, 
left the Prussian influence in Russia without any counter- 
poise. The proverbial luck of the King of Prussia never was 
better proved, for the Crimean War practically placed the 
power of Russia at the services of him who appeared as her 
only friend. 

The high-souled, chivalrous and patriotic Nicholas I. died 
broken-hearted with grief at the failure of his strenuous 
efforts to assure peace and prosperity to Russia. Not the 
least painful for him was his inability even to attempt 
to introduce the one progressive reform he had at heart all 
his hfe, the emancipation of the serfs. 

Russia was never governed more strictly according to German 
ideas than under Nicholas I. ; and yet that very mihtary, 
police and bureaucratic regime modelled on Prussia, with 
Germans in highest favour at Court and occupying most 
responsible posts in the government, saw a brilUant era of 
Russian poetry and literature, of Russian music and Russian 
art, of Russian national culture. A daily Press hardly existed 
then, books of any importance were few and far between ; 
a censorship, rigorous and suspicious, arbitrary and almost 
prohibitive, seemed to be there in order to crush all life of the 
spirit. That notwithstanding, high Uterary and pohtical ^^'i'^'/^^tTa 


talents in considerable number thronged round two or three pSSScopi'iuoa 

in Bauia. 

monthly reviews ; and their productiveness was so abundant 



and so valuable that it could not be entirely kept down. 
Between writers and readers was established so close and 
intimate a connection that it permitted the writers, in terms 
understood by the readers alone, as in a code language, to 
convey a clear and full statement of their thoughts. We 
cannot dwell here on the literary merit of that movement, 
but we must point to its ultimate victory over the whole 
system of repression on the part of the Germanized St. Peters- 
burg bureaucracy. A public opinion was created in Russia 
and its moral power has continuously and rapidly increased. 
S^v^r •»<> Most of the writers belonged to the school of the Zapadniki 
(Westerners), centred in St. Petersburg, eager to further Peter 
the Great's "reform," a more complete imitation of Western 
Europe, its liberties and self-government. But there was 
another school, the Slavophils, principally in Moscow, who 
were conservatives and partisans of Autocracy, which they 
only wanted to be rendered thoroughly Russian. They 
advocated a return to the dress and manners, customs and 
institutions of the Moscow period, the Zemsky Sabors included. 
They dared sharply to criticise Peter the Great's " Reform " 
and the whole St. Petersburg regime. The Zapadniki excelled in 
numbers, as well as in variety of talents. The Slavophils were 
characterized by depth of thought, purity of life, high moral 
standard and ardent patriotism. Nevertheless, these loyal 
and devoted monarchists were more suspected and disliked 
by the Germanized bureaucracy than even partisans of 
republican and socialistic ideas. Placing their class interests 
before those of the monarchy whose defenders they claimed 
to be, the St. Petersburg bureaucrats seized every opportunity 
for persecuting the Slavophils and hardly tolerated their 
existence. The time was evidently not yet arrived when 


Russians could freely assert their nationality in their own 

Both schools, however, had one trait in common, springing work of both 

' r u 'J BchooUi in favonr 

from the primordial democratic character of the Slavic jtion of the'° fer?^ 
race — love of the people, heightened by the consciousness of 
the great historic wrong suffered by the free labourers of 
Russia at the hands of Boris Godounoff currying favour 
with ambitious nobles. Economists, historians, philosophers, 
novelists set to work to persuade society and the government 
to remove it.* The mind of the Nation was made up on that 
subject before the first step was taken by the government. 

Nicholas I.'s reign witnessed the beginning of another RmsifledGemMx 
remarkable evolution, the appearance in public hfe of Russified 
Germans who brought to the service of the Russian nation- 
ality the energy and efficiency of their own race. They were 
chiefly offsprings of marriages in which either parent was 
orthodox, in which case the Russian law prescribed that children 
should belong to the Orthodox Church. Theoretically that law 
appears to infringe absolute rehgious freedom, but practically 
it proved to be of great benefit to Russia. The same result 
was often attained, however, by Russian education and 
surroundings. Under a Germanized government men of 
German descent enjoyed greater freedom of action and could 
more easily stand up for Russian national rights. The first 
Slavophil Committee was founded by Hilferding, The most 
ardent Slavophil of the seventies was Orest Miller. Many 
bearers of German names in our days not only do not yield 

• The name of one man deserves to be mentioned here, who helped 
more than any other to attain that end — I. S. Tourghenefl, whose 
"Memoirs of a Sportsman " played, in the emancipation of the Serfs 
in Russia, a part similar to that of Mrs. Beecher Stowe's " Uncle Tom's 
Cabin " in the emancipation of the slaves in America. 


to full-blooded Russians in their devotion to Russia, but are 
conspicuous by their Russian national spirit. The late M. 
Hartwig earned the boundless hatred of all the Germans by 
his strenuously carrying out Russian national and Slavophil 
pohcy in the Balkans, and was called in Berlin and Vienna the 
most dangerous and fanatical Panslavist. The writer could 
quote, from personal knowledge, many other German- Russians 
who are fighting in the forefront for Russia and Slavdom. 


Alexander II. {1855-1881). 
Alexander II. was a Liberal in the purest and highest sense Alexander n. as 

^ ^ a great Liberal 

of the word, a believer in the goodness of human nature, 
a humanitarian, full of generous impulses. His liberalism, 
if less radical than was Alexander I.'s in the beginning of his 
reign, was much deeper and firmer. He certainly loved Russia 
and the Russian People above everything, and was a true 
Russian himself, combining the firm as well as the soft 
sides of the Russian national character. He was animated 
by an ardent longing, not only to carry out the reform most 
desired by his father, but to regenerate Russia altogether. 
He would have made an ideal Russian ruler had he not also 
had the unfortunate trait of both his predecessors, the beUef 
in the superior civilizing mission of Germany and the trust 
in the friendship of the Hohenzollerns. 

The emancipation of the serfs was effected by Alexander II. t^J'^'f/pf^'""*" "' 
in spite of the opposition of the new aristocracy, the descen- 
dants of the favourites and great bureaucrats of the preceding 
reigns. The Emperor's strenuous insistence and unshakeable 
determination finally prevailed over all obstacles. The great 
measure was open to many criticisms from the juridical, 
economical and financial standpoint. To conservatives it 
appeared too radical and too democratic, almost revolutionary, 
as giving no compensation to serf-owners for the loss of the 


gratuitous work of their serfs, and as expropriating them in 
order to give a part of their land to the emancipated. Liberals, 
on the contrary, complained of the insufficiency of the land 
allotted to former serfs and would have liked to see it given 
them without indemnifying the landowners.* However, 
by the passing of that law the wrong done to the peasantry 
by Boris Godounoff was made good, and the descendants of 
the wronged were compensated with land, the acquisition of 
which was facilitated to them by the government. That one 
reform practically amounted to a peaceful revolution, and laid 
a basis for a reconstruction of the whole fabric of the Russian 
State. After the emancipation was passed in 1861, Russia 
was already quite different from what she had been during 
the Crimean war. Those who take her as being the same now 
are more than half a century late in their European history. 

The second great reform was that of Justice, the creation 
of Courts of Justice independent of the executive power. 
Recognizing that the high cost of justice placed it at the 
disposal of the rich alone, the Russian legislator strove to render 
justice accessible to the people at large, thus giving that reforni 
a decided democratic character. The third not less great 
reform was the introduction of a new way of local self- 
government, the creation of the Zemstvos, provincial and 
district representative assemblies, elected by all classes 

• Contemporaneously with the emancipation of the serfs in Russia 
took place that of the slaves in the United States of North America. 
Although it would not be fair to overlook the greater difficulties of the 
latter owing to the race question, one cannot but be greatly impressed 
by the Russian measure, much more radical than the American, being 
achieved without any serious perturbation, not to speak of a civil war. 
The emancipated slaves numbered about 3J millions ; the Russian 
serfs were 22 millions belonging to the Noblesse and 21 millions owned 
by the State, about 43 millions in all. 


of the population. They were a continuation and an expansion 
of Catherine's Assembhes of the Noblesse. And just as the 
latter prepared men for the work of the Zemstvos, these formed 
other men for the work of the State Douma. 

Among other reforms should be mentioned an extension 6r«at«r reugio« 
of municipal self-government ; an aboHtion of all censorship 
for books and of a preventive one for newspapers, a beginning 
of the freedom of the Press ; also a greater rehgious tolerance, 
a milder treatment of the Russian dissenters (raskolniki). 
The writer cannot here omit pointing to one of the grossest 
errors concerning Russia consistently imposed by the Germans 
on public opinion in England, the pretended intolerance 
towards West European Churches in Russia. Since the begin- 
ning of the St. Petersburg period all West Europeans were 
treated in Russia as superior beings, and enjoyed all freedom 
which was denied to Russians ; their churches were much 
more independent of the State than the so-called " dominant " 
Church of Russia. The Lutheran Church, to which belonged 
the German Noblesse of the Baltic provinces as well as a large 
part of the St. Petersburg Court and bureaucracy, was 
practically the most privileged church in Russia. Restrictions 
were imposed upon that part of the Roman Catholic clergy 
which had a leading r61e in Polish pohtical agitation ; but real 
intolerance was practised only regarding Dissenters from 
Russian Orthodoxy. 

The Dissenting movement originated in a protest against 
the " correction " of the copies of the Bible and of the rites 
of the Church of Russia to bring them into agreement with 
the Orthodox Churches of the East, and had grown enormously 
since the Westernizing " Reform " of Peter the Great. It 
constituted, as we remarked before, a form of national protest 


against the compulsory imposition of foreign ways of life. 
The German rulers of Russia saw in it a direct opposition 
to their power over that country, and Biron instituted against 
those sectarians a systematic persecution. Catherine, very 
tolerant herself, introduced as much tolerance towards the 
Dissenters as was compatible with the spirit of the Russian 
upper classes at the time. Their treatment became harder 
again under Nicholas I., but Alexander II. rightly saw in the 
Dissenters Russians misled by false doctrines, but who had 
faithfully preserved their nationaUty and loyalty towards the 
throne and the country. When he had, partially at least, 
eased their condition, a deputation of the Old Behevers told 
him : — " In the innovations of Thy reign we see the good old 
times so dear to us coming back again." That was the best 
testimony for the character at once Hberal and national of 
Alexander II. 's home policy. Nothing proves better the mis- 
leading influence in Western Europe of the opinions " made 
in Germany " than, on one side, the acceptance as truth of 
the perfectly false accusations of intolerance towards West 
European faiths and, on the other, a total absence of 
sympathy with the victims of real intolerance.* 

Largely democratic reforms were introduced by Alexander 
II. in Finland, making the Finnish language, spoken by the 
people, to be the official language of the country, beside the 
Swedish spoken by the upper classes, and giving the Finnish 
people in general equal rights with the Swedish minority. 
Reforms very favourable to the Poles were planned and were 
being appUed, when most unfortunately an insurrection stirred 

• The only well-known writer who showed a sympathetic interest 
in Russian Dissenters was Hepworth Dixon in his books on Russia. 


guided by his 


up from abroad by the enemies of both Slavic peoples defeated 
the work of Alexander II. 

The reforming Emperor intended to crown the edifice by 
the grant of a constitution. Just at the moment when he was 
going to carry out his plan he fell a victim of a most undeserved 
catastrophe. Never was there perpetrated a crime more 
abominable and more stupid ! It put the clock back in Russia 
for a quarter of a century. 

It is painful to pass from a survey of Alexander II.'s home f^^f^^'^i 

guided by '.... 

pohcy to that of his foreign one. Only one common trait ^^^Slfand^iuB i 

trnit in William I. 

unites both, purity and generosity of motives. His foreign 1 

policy was guided by his general German sympathies, by his j 

deep regard for and complete trust in his maternal uncle, 1 

WiUiam I. of Prussia, and also the influence of Bismarck ; 

with him and his Chancellor, Gortchakoff. The Prussian ' 

sympathies of the Court, of the diplomatic service and the higher * 

bureaucracy had a similar effect. The almost universal dis- i 

approval of that policy by Russian pubUc opinion, as well as < 

the misgivings of clearsighted statesmen and writers, were | 

utterly disregarded. Yet each of the three great successive ! 

stages of the rise of Prussia was not less directly harmful ] 

to the vital interests of Russia, than to those of Europe in , 

The conquest of Schleswig-Holstein changed the balance pnuaiftu rocceue* 

of power on the Baltic, depriving Russia of her predominance intert.t.. 1 

there and preparing that of Germany. The exclusion of Austria \ 

from the Germanic Confederation destroyed the balance of ; 

power within the latter, which both the greatest rulers of j 
Russia, Peter and Catherine, were so anxious to preserve, 
and it necessarily made the minor German States dependent 
on Prussia. At the same time, Austria's exclusion from 


Germany, together with the loss of her possessions in Ital>\. 
made her extension into the Balkans the one aim of the Austrian 
policy, placing Austria in an irreconcilable antagonism to 
Russia and obUging her to seek an alliance with Germany. 
Finally, the German victory over France led to a definitive 
unification of Germany under Prussia, and to the restoration 
of the German Empire with its traditional claims of universal 
supremacy, as the heir of the Roman Empire. 

The clearest interest and duty of the Russian Government 
was to have prevented those achievements, or at least 
provided each time some compensations or guarantees 
with the view of maintaining the balance of power in 

It seems incredible, but is nevertheless true, that 
Alexander II. zealously supported 'and enthusiastically 
rejoiced over them. In 1870, particularly, it was Russia's 
threat to attack Austria, if she joined France, which made 
Austria, and through her Italy also, renounce their aUiance 
with Napoleon III. The conditions imposed on France 
appeared, in truth, too hard in St. Petersburg, but Bismarck 
won Alexander II.'s consent by assuring him that otherwise 
William I. would lose his throne and monarchy would be 
^k^rudgei the imperilled in Europe. William I. spoke the truth when, on the 

declilve vMne of 

ti«.upportof conclusion of peace, he telegraphed his thanks to Alexander 
II., declaring that " after the Almighty, it was to him that 
Germany owed most of her success." 

The Russian government demanded no equivalent for the 
immeasurably valuable assistance they had lent to Prussia. 
Alexander II., Gortchakoff and all the friends of Germany in 
St. Petersburg firmly believed, however, that WiUiam I. 
and Bismarck would seize the first opportunity for testifying. 


by deeds, the boundless gratitude they expressed so often 

and in such glowing terms. The Balkan crisis of 1875-78 ^°f^"^°^ent 

convinced that 

seemed to afford the best opportunity for domg so, and it ^^^o"^*"^'^"!"^ 

to prove her 

looked as if Bismarck had indeed resolved to avail himself m-aiiwde. 
of it in order to pay off Germany's debt to Russia and thus 
to secure her friendship for ever. The confidence of the Russian 
governing circles in Bismarck's devotion to them had grown 
to such an extent that they appUed to him for advice in all 
important matters and he became the actual leader of the 
foreign poHcy of Russia. 

Bismarck's real aims and the origin of the Balkan crisis ^l°l^■,5^^^* 
were well known to a few observers (among them the present 
writer), who repeatedly warned Russian diplomatists against 
their delusions, but could not make them reahze the unpalatable 
truth. In May, 1875, Bismarck, greatly impressed by the rapid 
recovery of France after her terrible disaster, decided to strike 
a new and more crushing blow. The usual Press campaign 
was particularly violent, and was accompanied by military 
preparations of an undoubtedly threatening character. All 
Europe was alarmed, and Alexander II., as a proved friend of 
Germany, advised William I. to abstain from an aggression 
which could not be approved by Russia. His advice was 
supported by similar representations of the British government. 
Both Russia and England had, to a different degree, been |^i*d^°?„,„., 

Oenn»ny fromi 

favourable to the unification of Germany, but neither of them [^^y^fg;^"" 
wished to see a further diminution of France. Bismarck 
stoutly denied having ever thought of attacking France. 
Struck by the wholly unexpected concurrence of England and 
Russia, he resolved to prevent a repetition of it in future by 
pushing Russia into a war which would at once weaken her 
and place her in opposition with England. 



£iiii:.irck dacides 
to we&ken Raieia 
by war and to 
place her in 
antagonicm to 

Gtntany chooses 
to stir up 
iSGnrrection In 

The story of the German policy in 1875-78 is most instruc- 
tive, and ought to be told in detail. The writer hopes to be 
able to do it in another work ; here he is only going to point 
to the most striking facts which have never yet seen the light 
of day. Bismarck went on preparing the war he held to be 
necessary for rendering Germany supreme in the same 
unscrupulous manner as William 11. in our days. The interests 
of all other Nations and of Humanity itself, as well as all moral 
principles, were entirely subordinated to that one goal. The 
only difference lay in the sense of reahties, and in the 
adaptation of means to ends, which characterized Bismarck's 
action and ensured its success. 

As the Turkish misrule gave a permanent ground of dis- 
content to the Christians of Turkey, it was easy to stir up 
among them an insurrection which would involve the Balkan 
States and, later on, Russia. Bismarck chose for that purpose 
Herzegovina, peopled by war-like tribes and contiguous to 
Austrian territory. He imparted his ideas to high personages 
of the Vienna Court. Francis Joseph's approval was easily 
obtained, and the execution was entrusted to an ambitious 
Slav general, Roditch, governor general of Dalmatia. The 
plan was kept secret from the Austro-Hungarian Foreign 
Minister, Count Andrassy, who, at that epoch, like most 
Magyars, was opposed to any increase of the Slav population 
of the Hapsburg monarchy. The first rising occurred among 
the prot^g^s of Austria, the Catholics of Herzegovina, while 
the Orthodox majority of the country was rather un- 
favourable to the movement. They were finally drawn into 
it ; Bosnia followed their example ; and a year later, Serbia 
and Montenegro joined the brethren of their race. 

The Turks, as usual, committed many atrocities, not only 



in Herzegovina and Bosnia, but also in Bulgaria. Public 
opinion was stirred up in all Europe, and nowhere did the ; 

indignation rise higher or find a more eloquent expression than 
in England. The Russian people, who were always deploring ] 

the oppression of Eastern Christians and longing to free them i 

from it, were most impressed by Gladstone's thundering 
indictment against Turkey, and felt they could no longer ! 

remain passive. Numerous volunteers of all classes went out 
to help Serbia, and those of the peasantry, when asked why | 

they were doing it, mostly answered : — " To suffer for 
Christ ! "* j 

The Russian government, taken unawares by these events ?j,7^',X''" <" i 

Government to I 

in the midst of vast reforms necessitating financial operations ^'^^^ «'". 

whose success depended on the maintenance of peace, were 

most unwilUng to go to war. They asked the advice of — i 

Bismarck. This candid friend expressed his astonishment at 

the hesitations of the Russian diplomacy, criticized its 

indecision, and ridiculed its fear of England and Austria. 

He positively promised that Germany would prevent any inter- i'rmanyfsTp'^rt ' 

vention of other Powers, and would see to it that Russia fill^'it^oTbta"" i 

concerning bi3 

should not be despoiled of the fruit of her efforts.f Later on '°y»^*y- j 

he saw in the continued moderation of Russia a doubt of j 

Germany's and his own loyalty. He told d'Oubril : — " A 
repetition by Germany of the Austrian betrayal in 1855 is j 

unthinkable, particularly when I am at the helm."{ ..." It 

* The writer, who was in Moscow in the autumn of 1876, heard that 
answer repeatedly from those peasants who had made a vow to go on 

pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and thought it was still better to go to fight ■ 

the enemies of Christ. The same religious spirit animates the Russian I 

people in the present war. j 

t Reports by d'Oubril, Russian Ambassador in Berlin, of December > 

17 and 23, 1876. I 

X Report by the same of April 6, 1877. 1 


is in the traditions of Austria to keep a dagger in her bosom 
in order to strike a friend ; it is not Germany who would be 
capable of such a dastardly policy."* 
simnitaneonsiy It is HOW kuown from Austrian, as well as from German 

be warat Auitniv ' 

agaisit Rnuia .i/- jii-i i-ii 

cSman^i"." ort ^^tiientic sources that, simultaneously with those assurances, 
Bismarck was warning the Vienna Cabinet of the hostile 
designs of Russia against it. He even informed Andrassy 
that, asked by Russia about Germany's attitude in case 
Russia attacked Austria, he firmly declared Germany would 
defend the Hapsburg Monarchy with all her forces. 

ffi^«ck'» plans. Bismarck's plans succeeded perfectly. The Russian Govern- 

He promites 

IwtocoiSrMs' orient were drawn into the war they neither planned nor 

to ratify the 

s^Bufaio. Wished. England stifled her generous impulses under the pre- 

sumed necessity of defending her Empire from an imminent 
danger. Austria, tempted by an eventual gain of territory, 
fell under Germany's influence. However, Russia, after 
lavishly shedding the blood of her sons and squandering her 
material resources, just then most needed for her internal 
regeneration, overcame all obstacles set to her Crusade. She 
compelled Turkey to accept the resurrection of Bulgaria, 
the independence of Roumania and of Serbia, and the 
liberation of Macedonia.f The Powers who " put their 

• Report of April 20, 1877. 

■f Article 2 of the treaty of St. Stefano says : — " La Sublime Porte 
reconnalt ddfinitivement I'ind^pendance de la Principant6 du 
Montenegro," The Turkish occasional pretensions to a suzerainty of 
Montenegro never having had any real foundation whatever the 
definitive renunciation to them by the Porte was not counted as a 
gain by either Montenegro or Russia, and had only a retrospective 
value. The crushing by Russia of the Turkish power of resistance 
paved the way to a subsequent interpolation in the treaty of Berlin 
of a clause in favour of a rectification of the Turco-Greek frontier which 
was subsequently developed into a cession of Thessaly to Greece by the 
treaty of Constantinople, May, 1881. 


money on a wrong horse " threatened to make war on Russia 
unless the treaty of San Stefano was revised. Bismarck won 
Russia's consent to it by promising so to direct the discussions 
of the Congress as to secure the recognition of the stipulations 
of that treaty. The belief in Bismarck's devotion to Russia 
was so absolute at the St. Petersburg Court that one of the 
highest personages of Russia wrote to the Emperor : — 
" Bismarck is sure to arrange everything in the best way for 
us, if only Gortchakoff does not spoil it." 

Bismarck arranged, indeed, everything in the best way |5*,J^»5jj,°/j^,' 
for — Germany. Liberated Macedonia was given back to 
Turkey, the lot of her Christian inhabitants was much 
worsened, and for 35 years more the unfortunate province 
constituted the chief centre of unrest in the Near East and a 
source of everlasting conflicts among the Balkan States as well 
as among the Great Powers. Germany alone profited by it, 
directly or indirectly frustrating every scheme of reforms, 
and appearing in the eyes of the Turks as their only friend. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, who had struggled and suffered 
most of all, were placed under the Austrian yoke, more 
dangerous for their religion and nationality than was the 
Turkish. Austria became a Balkan Power and strove to 
dominate the whole Peninsula ; acting henceforward in an 
irreconcilable antagonism to Russia, she was thus made entirely 
dependent on the support of Germany and had to submit 
to her leadership. England and Russia, who had seemed at 
one moment to be quite united in their sympathy with the 
Eastern Christians and in their condemnation of Turkish 
tyranny, became more than ever estranged the one from the 
other, and their co-operation in any question was for a long 
time rendered impossible. Russia, considerably weakened 


and exhausted, could no more dispute German pre-eminence 
in Europe. 
m?nt ^"°"'*' Alexander 11. naturally experienced a most cruel disappoint- 
ment. When, at the beginning of the Oriental crisis, a Russian 
statesman cautiously uttered some doubts concerning the 
German policy, the Emperor, looking painfuUy surprised, 
asked him : — " Do you doubt my uncle's honour ? " The 
alliance of Germany with Austria unmistakeably proved those 
doubts were quite justified. Wilham I. himself was perfectly 
aware of the moral value of his policy. He wrote to Bismarck 
that to conclude an aUiance against Alexander II., after all 
he had done for Germany, was " manifestly dishonourable." 
Nevertheless, he finally concluded it. 

A high dignitary of the Court of Berhn, very attached to 
William I. and hostile to Bismarck, confided to the writer 
the "true reason" of that Emperor's consent to the alliance 
against Russia. That consent was won by Bismarck's quoting 
the words of Frederick II. : — " We Kings of Prussia sacrifice 
to the State, not only our life, but also our honour." The 
old courtier added : — "that was of course an argument which 
the Emperor could never withstand." 


Alexander III {1881-1894). 
Alexander III. ascended the throne under the immediate stnotiyconsar- 

v»tive Policy. 

impression of his father's terrible fate. It was but natural 
that he should, first of all, seek to consolidate the lawful order 
and to strengthen the power and efficiency of his Government. 
Bismarck knew how to profit by that state of things, and 
offered a renewal of the Russo-German friendship on the 
basis, not of sentiment, but of practical usefulness ; explicit 
agreements were to secure precise mutual advantages. He 
succeeded, moreover, in throwing the responsibihty at the 
Berlin Congress on Gortchakoff, who had " misunderstood 
him and thwarted Bismarck's disinterested efforts to serve 
the Russian cause." Nothing could be cleverer and more 
advantageous to Germany. Her treachery to Russia was thus 
condoned, and she was credited with having repaid the 
services of Russia and so owing her no gratitude in future. 

The apparent frankness and outspokenness of Bismarck's TiieAiiianceofun 

Three Emperon 

proposals appealed to the straightforward and practical 
mind of Alexander III., and the Germanophil elements in 
St. Petersburg enthusiastically supported the return to the 
old policy. The year 1885 saw the restoration of the Alliance 
of the Three Emperors, the greatest and last success of 
Bismarck. The true character of it was best described by 
German comic papers which represented Austria, as a 





Bismarck' c 
roEc^cdes an 
allvasce viith 

tame elephant decoying a wild one, Russia, into the custody 
of a keeper, Germany. Bismarck's plan, as the writer, residing 
in Berlin, 1885-92, was able to ascertain from authoritative 
German sources, was to push on Austria to the ^Egean Sea 
and Russia towards India, then to compel France to enter a 
customs Union with Germany and to become her political 
vassal like Austria. After years of the struggle between the 
Elephant and the Whale, the Central European Federation, 
led by Germany, would have imposed peace on them, 
receiving compensations from both sides.* 

But Alexander III., while faithfully fulfilling his part of 
the agreement, clearly saw through Bismarck's fallacies and 
became fully aware of the deceit practised by him on Russia. 
He took courageously the only counter-measure possible, 
he concluded an alliance with France. Those only who 
realized the strength and subtlety of the German influences 
at the Russian Court and in the Russian Government could 
duly appreciate the greatness of Alexander III.'s achievement. 
He was enabled to perform it by his remarkably clear though 
limited vision of Russia' a position and interests, and by his 
indomitable fortitude in carrying out ever}^ decision once 
adopted. He never hesitated to sacrifice his preferences 
and prejudices to the good of his country. A firm believer in 
autocracy he nevertheless became the sincere ally of a republic. 
The Germans and Germany-serving elements in Russia bowed 

* To the writer's private knowledge, during the short existence of 
the renewed Alliance of the Three Emperors, Bismarck made a series 
of attempts to embroil Russia with England. On the occasion of the 
Penjdeh incident in 1885, he urged Russian diplomatists to an energetic 
action. In 1880 he strongly advised the Russian occupation of Bulgaria, 
etc., etc. Once, in order to overcome the objections against a strong 
action, he offered the support of a German army corps. 


down to the inevitable, hoping to paralyse the new policy in 
execution and gradually to restrict its scope and singificance. 
Soon after the eonclusiDn of the Franco-Russian Alliance, 
one of the highest and most influential Russian diplomatists 
tried to impress on the writer that in his work as a publicist, 
he " ought to be guided by that truth, that the interests of 
Russia and Germany were identical." 

The state of mind of the St. Petersburg governing circles, 
as described above, accounts for tlie astonishing fact that 
during tlie reign of the monarch whose general policy was 
opposed to Germany, the latter made great progress in two 
most important directions. In the middle of the eighties, 
just when Bismarck was once more drawing the Russian 
diplomacy into Germany's orbit, the first German military 
and financial missions went to Turkey ; and early in the German penetra- 

■^ •' tion into Turkey. 

nineties, the foundation of the German domination was laid 

on the Bosphorus. In tlie same period, tlie German colonization Gtrmiu coioniza. 

'■ ^ tion in EuMia. 

of Russia was conducted on a large scale. German syndicates, 
directed by the German Government, were buying land in 
Russian Poland as well as in Western and Southern Russia, 
whicli they were afterwards reselling to German farmers. 
The influence of the St. Petersburg Germans, adroitly assisted 
by the German diplomacy, contrived to keep the Russian 
Government in ignorance of so methodical an activity, which 
was only disclosed by a private investigation organized by a 
Russian montlily review {Roussky Vesinik). Tlie figures 
published by it, showing the extent of that pacific invasion, 
produced a great sensation at the moment, but were soon 
forgotten by the public, while the Germanophil forces in Russia 
succeeded, first in delaying and then in shelving all the measures 
intended to defend Russia against a disguised German conquest. 


Against those colossal achievements of the German policy 
we may record one modest, but important victory of the 
Russian cause over Germanism in Russia. The extraordinary 
privileges granted by Peter the Great to Esthonia and 
Livonia, and conceded also to Courland on its annexation by 
Catherine, made of those provinces with their own laws and 
administration, and German as the official language, an 
imperium in imperio ; they secured to the German Noblesse 
an absolute control over the non-German native population. 
Those privileges needed confirmation by every succeeding 
sovereign, generally given on his accession. Alexander III. 
declined to confirm them. This national and democratic 
policy was the first act to lighten the terrible tyranny of the 
German barons over the people of those provinces. 
Aie^.dlr n.« Ij^ Russia proper, the chief aim of Alexander III.'s ministers 


was to fight the revolution, with which object they tried to 
curtail some of Alexander II. 's reforms and placed the eman- 
cipated serfs under the guidance of special functionaries, thus 
separating them from other classes and keeping them in a 
state of half freedom. There are reasons, however, to think 
that Alexander III. was personally not at all opposed to free 
institutions when once public order and the reign of law were 
permanently secured. From statesmen who had approached 
him, the writer learned that the Emperor felt a warm interest 
in old Russian institutions, the Zemsky Sabors included. 
It was very unfortunate he did not find among his advisers 
anyone who could give him that full information about them 
he desired to possess. 

Still, the Russian people judged Alexander III. aright, 
considering him a thorough Russian. It was generally known 
that he consistently refused to give preference to Germans over 


Russians in the military and civil services. He even began to 
Russify the Russian diplomatic body ; he rendered the Russian 
language obligatory in its domestic correspondence. He made 
himself greatly popular \vith the masses by abolishing Peter 
the Great's ordinance forbidding servants of the State to R«tnrn to national 
wear the beard which he himself allowed to grow. Also he 
modified the uniforms of the army, making them resemble 
national costumes still in use with the masses. Such changes 
may seem superficial to those unacquainted with Russia, but 
they had a deep meaning, constituting concessions to the senti- 
ments of the great majority of the people, or rather a return 
of the Monarch to the unaltered popular way of thinking. 
We saw how Peter the Great caused a rift in the Russian 
nation by his compulsory introduction of foreign manners. 
Alexander II. did a great deal towards heahng it by his 
great democratic reforms. Alexander III. added to them the 
adoption by the Sovereign and Dynasty of some of the 
people's ways. And his pure and happy family life set a fine 
example to Russian Society, and endeared him to the Russian 
people. He was the first quite national Emperor of Russia, Alexander ni. ».i 

^ '^ ^ ^ 'the fmmder at a 

and could almost be regarded as the founder of a new and S^iJt^""'" 
purely national Russian Dynasty. 



The Present Reign : Period of Conservatism 


pi'^at^ef-u'in * '^^^ prcseiit rcigii in Russia, so full of startling and decisive 
events, must be regarded as an era of fulfilments and con- 
summations. The two last reigns brought Russia to a turning 
point. Problems dating from the dawn of Russian history 
and vital for the Russian Empire came to the front and had 
to be solved without any further postponement. Aspirations 
of the Russian people, invariably manifested througii the 
thousand years of its existence, had to be at last satisfied, 
if Russia was to fulfil her destiny. Alexander II. 's reforms, 
leading to a reconstruction of the State and society in con- 
formity' with the democratic character of the Slavic race, 
had been abrupt^ broken off, and a reactionary current had 
set in favourable to the arbitrariness of the bureaucracy 
and the privileges of the ruling circles. Alexander Ill.'s policy, 
to free Russia inside and out from a more or less disguised 
German yoke, was as yet uncompleted. Hostile forces were 
working to replace that yoke. A failure to take up again and 
completely to achieve both tasks would have exposed Russia 
to either revolution or reaction, and helped the hereditary 
enemy of Slavdom in his designs to bring the only great 
Slav Power under his sway. 


Such were the difficulties and perils which awaited at his i"i-i905, 

t Continuation tf 

r ■!-« • T^T AlsTindir ra I 

accession the twenty-six years old Autocrat of Russia. Ihe vouoj. 
first period of Nicholas II. 's reign, 1894-1905, appeared chiefly 
as a continuation of his father's rule, Alexander III.'s great 
achievement, the French Alliance, was faithfully maintained, 
and his general policy, of peace abroad and order at home, 
carefully pursued. A strong minister, Plehve, made a determined 
attempt, on the one hand to stamp out the revolutionary 
agitation by force, on the other, so to amend and regularize the 
bureaucracy as to enable it to go on governing Russia without 
tke co-operation of independent social elements. This attempt 
proved a decided failure. The systematic repression of the 
revolutionary movement by force alone, though it greatly 
restrained its outbursts, did not succeed in eradicating it. On 
the contrary, that agitation, till then confined to groups of 
intellectuals, penetrated into the working classes of large cities 
and even, by forged proclamation in the name of the Tsar, 
incited the peasants to burn the landlords' mansions and seize 
their property. The Zemstvos and the municipalities, the 
propertied and the professional classes, unduly restrained 
and interfered with in their activity, were dissatisfied and had 
no means of defenchng their interests and combating the 
revolution. The bureaucratic machine was already in an 
advanced state of deterioration, and private interests dominated 
the bureaucrats. Members of influential coteries, at the 
Court and in the administration, feeling themselves threatened 
in the enjoyment of tiieir illegal privileges, were trying 
betimes to get for themselves, to tlie detriment of the State, 
as many private advantages as they could. Corruption 
of all kinds and on a large scale was alarmingly on the 


oennanv, bent on Xhc cfforts of thc privileged to retain the power in their 
^^"•"mSui "^ hands were systematically encouraged and assisted by German 
venturee. influcnces within and without. The policy of the Berlin 

Government towards Russia underwent a radical change 
after the unification of Germany. Weak Prussia needed a 
strong Russia to protect her and to help to attain her aims 
of aggrandisement. But, when, thanks to the unselfisii services 
of Russia, Prussia had absorbed Germany, she wanted her 
late protector to become her sateUite, and in order to ensure 
this, considered it necessary first to weaken Russia by pushing 
her into hazardous and disastrous undertakings. She could 
succeed only by the help of those irresponsible coteries whose 
influence she was trying to maintain. 

As Germany herself now cast eyes on the Near East she tried 

to divert Russia's attention from it and direct it towards the 

Far East. Her efforts were crowned with success, and she 

could undertake the construction of the Bagdad Railway and 

ABtiBrttiih establish her exclusive influence on the Bosphorus. German 

coaJitlon defeated 

BTusiltoj'oijijt. diplomacy hoped also to utilize the German leanings of St. 
Petersburg in order to effect, with the help of Russia, a 
rapprochement with France. During the South African 
War the Berhn Cabinet, and the Emperor William himself, 
strained every nerve to form a coahtion against Great Britain. 
The pronounced friendliness of the Emperor Nicholas towards 
the latter disconcerted those schemes. 

German piedAM Lack of space does not allow us to relate here the German 

to Enula dnnnx ^ 

wiles in order to involve Russia into a war with Japan. After 
succeeding in that, Germany gave Russia an apparently 
generous guarantee of the safety of the Western Russian 
frontier and an assurance that she would not undertake 
anything in Europe to the disadvantage of Russia. Immediately 

Ibe Jap«n«M w*t 


afterwards, however, she began to press for the conclusion Extortion <rf 

' 'Or economical 

of a Russo-German treaty of commerce : and dunne the '^^^^^ the tr«»ty 

</ ' *-* or commerce 

, . . -, _, 1 • 1 r 'ini^'w^lent to a 

negotiations, the German Government made capital out of ^0"^™^'^** 
its " generosity," frequently hinting it would be put to a 
severe test should Russia not prove her gratitude by far- 
reaching commercial concessions. All discussion of that 
treaty pending its conclusion was suppressed in the Russian 
Press, and it was only last year, at the approach of negotiations 
for a new treaty, that competent Russian speciaHsts were at 
last able to point out the one-sided charges it imposed on 
Russia, so that in fact the treaty amounted to the payment of 
an immense tribute. Notwithstanding this Germany began, 
just before the conclusion of the Peace of Portsmouth, a 
diplomatic campaign against France and, as is known to the 
writer from the best German sources, contemplated sending 
an ultimatum to Russia, asking if she intended to maintain 
her aUiance with France, in which case, Germany, "to her Projected atuck 

■^ on France uid 

sincere regret," would be obUged by military considerations Ru«i»io'i9os. 
to direct her main forces first of all against the Russian frontier. 
It is possible that those intentions, and the unguarded state 
of the frontier in consequence of the German pledges, 
accelerated the end of the war with Japan. 

Deeply laid plans were methodically pursued for strengthen- The carman 
ing German influence in Russia. Systematic colonization of u^ic*otrmM 

colonization ot 

the frontier provinces of Russia was hurriedly pushed for%vard. "«*"'''"»*•■ 
The greatest progress was made in the Vistulian region 
(Poland), in the Baltic provinces and in South Western Russia. 
Russian authorities in Poland had been persuaded that in 
favouring German immigrants they were acquiring for Russia 
quiet and obedient subjects, able and willing to defend her 
against Polish nationalism. Those immigrants have proved 


and are, indeed, proving their abUitj' and willingness to 
serve the German armies in the present war. They furnish 
them with their best spies, and are appointed to administrative 
posts in the parts of Poland occupied by the Germans. 
«on°i"h°Bi,"«c In 1905 a violent insurrection of the Letts, natives of 


Livonia, shattered the domination of the German barons and 
would have put an end to Germanism in the Baltic provinces, 
had not the Russian Government taken to heart the appeals 
of the perishing barons and sent a strong force which saved 
^ them from annihilation and replaced the Lettish and Russian 

population under their sway. The dangers which had threatened 
Germanism gave a pretext for an agitation in Germany, 
and large funds were collected there " for restoring 
Deulschfhum in the German Baltic provinces." Farmers 
and labourers, foresters and inspectors were sent hither from 
Germany, and the German hold on the East Baltic coast has 
become firmer than ever. There are certainly Baltic Germans 
bound by interest and sentiment to the Russian Empire ; 
man}' of them are in the Russian Army valiantly fighting 
the Germans ; and at the beginning of this war their number 
was increased by volunteers. It is perplexing, however, 
to know tiiat other Baltic Germans have joined the German 
Army as volunteers ; in some cases, brothers are fighting 
against each other. 
Btoiypin on the lu Januarv, iQio, the present writer, in an interview with 

urgent neceisity to ^ . ^ i 

airman fnv«io"fl the Primc Mlnistcr Stolypin, called his attention to the efforts 

of Western Russia. •' '■ 

of Germany in that part of Russia. Stolypin replied that he 
recognized the gravity of the matter, but there was a much 
more actual danger witli which the Government had to deal, 
the immigration of Germans into the South-Western provinces, 
which took the form of a systematic invasion. A bill had 


just been framed and would immediately be presented to the 
Douma, which, Stolypin was confident, " would vote it with- 
out delay on account of its extreme urgency." That bill never 
even came up for discussion in the Douma, and was withdrawn 
in 1913 by Stotypin's successor. So great was the German 
influence with every party in the Russian Parliament as well 
as with the Government. This war and the voice of the Press 
compelled the bureaucrats to undertake the framing of a new 
bill against the passage of landed property into German hands. 
The accounts of it given in the newspapers show, however, 
how ineffective it was, and even now such a bill is meeting 
with great opposition* on the part of Gerfnan-Russians, 
Germanophils and pacifists who, in spite of the treachery of 
German colonists in Poland still believe in the harmlessness 
of the German colonization.f 

But it is not onlv to iielp a militarx' invasion that the German German coianin- 

■J i^ -" tion as » men n.~. of 

Government was directing the stream of emigration towards JS^o^'m^/'^'"* 
Russia. Their deeper plans have been revealed to us by 
Pan-German writers. To take one out of many, Karl Jentsch J 
advised, in 1905, a systematic buying up b}' German syndicates 
of large estates of the Russian nobles, as well as of the peasants' 
communal land. The syndicates were to resell their acquisitions 
to "skilful and intelligent German farmers wlio would 
scientifically cultivate them with clieap Russian labour." 
Then German tradesmen would settle in small towns and make 

* Since the above was written the firmness of the Government, 
supported bv a unanimous public opinion, succeeded in breaking down 
that op]X)sition, and a decree has been issued considerably limiting 
the possession of land in Russia by Germans. The Press generally 
approves it, but points at several loopholes favourable to Germans. 

t After this was written it became known that an attempted Turkish 
raid, guided bv German olficers near Akerman on the iiessarabian coast, 
found a warm welcome from German colonists in Bessarabia. 

J In an article entitled " Grosideutscliland " in the " Zukunft," 
September, 1905. 



attempt to gftln 
tbe allegiance of 
all mbjecta of 
other States of 
6«nBao deicent. 

them prosperous centres of German culture. Manufacturers 
would follow and found great factories, utilizing on a large 
scale cheap Russian labour. Thus, wrote Jentsch, " the vast 
territory the Russians are unable to cultivate themselves would 
receive its full value, and the regenerated Russia would form 
an appendage to the Central European agglomeration of States 
directed by Germany. The latter would discover the reward 
for her work of implanting culture in Russia by finding in 
it an immense field for the activity of the surplus of her 
population, which would not be lost for the Fatherland as 
when it emigrates to America." The Pan-German writer 
laid down a characteristic condition for the full success of 
the Germanization of Russia. " The German landlords must 
be much less harsh and imperious than were the German 
barons of the Baltic provinces." 

It is now quite certain that this plan was deliberately adopted 
by the German Government, and that a great part of it has 
already been carried out. German colonists in Russia who 
wanted to return to Germany were told by Gennan Consuls 
it was their duty towards their German fatherland to remain 
in Russia and work there for the German cause. Encouraged 
by the amazing passivity of the Russian Government as well 
as of the Douma, the Germans have been gaining ground in 
Russia with every year. A new and powerful impulse was 
given by the passing in the German Reichstag, in 1911,* of 
the bill " on the Conservation of the German Nationality," 
completed in 1913 by another bill " on the double subjection " 

• During the discussion of that law in the Reichstag in 191 1, 
attempts were made in a Russian newsp)aper to point out the danger 
arising from it for countries with descendants of German immigrants. 
Neither the bureaucracy nor the public paid any attention to the 


which permitted the " recovery " of that NationaUty to all 
descendants of former German subjects by means of a private 
" declaration " to German Consuls. The significance of that 
law has just been explained by a Frankfort Lecturer on 
International Law, Strupp, a recognized authority in 
Germany on that matter. 

In an article entitled " The Juridical Status of Germans who ^^f^^^^. 

ic T e /" of »uoh double 

are British Subjects," Herr Strupp asserts that If a German gi^J^^^ *«g^f/» 

. against thsir 

is also a British subject, that circumstance has no influence on ot^er cooatry 
his rights and duties as a German subject." " Such an 
' Englishman ' (Strupp uses the inverted commas with an 
evident intention) is bound to fulfil his military duty in the 
German Army. He cannot evade paying German mihtary 
taxes. In return for that, he enjoys the fulness of the rights 
of a German subject ; in particular he is not to be interned 
in concentration camps, is not obliged to register himself 
at the pohce station, etc." But, if he refuses to join the 
German Army fighting against the country of which he is 
also a subject, he is — according to Strupp — liable to be treated 
as a deserter and a traitor. 

With a marvellous unanimity the Governments of all the Many mbjecta of 

^ Other States 

countries possessing such double subjects have ignored and Germ»a»«bj»cu 
continue to ignore the law whose effect essentially concerns 
them all. It is alleged tliat hundreds of thousands of former 
German subjects have made the "private" declarations 
required from them and are secretly fulfilling their duties 
towards their recovered Fatherland. If that were verified 
many otherwise obscure events in the present war would be 
explained. However important that matter is for all States ^,»^',':^^*^«^^ 
with Teuton subjects — and it seems to become very prominent 
in the United States just now — it nowhere could attain the 

of Oerman coloaiua 
In Rojuia. 


importance it has in Russia, where tlie Germans have, in the 
last two centuries, been the ruhng race and where their 
influence still permeates the wliole administration of the 
State, as well as that of most of the great financial and indus- 
trial companies. Every day since the war began new facts 
come to tlie surface whicli, long known to many, could not be 
pubhcly stated till now. For instance, we are learning that in 
the self-governing German colonies in the South of Russia 
everybody is in possession of guns, the permission to have 
them liaving been easily obtained from the local authorities, 
while all sucli requests of Russian peasants were stubbornly 
refused as dangerous. We know also tliat colonies of late 
years have invariably been established at important 
strategical points, junctions of railways, etc. Under the 
pretext of shooting parties, German colonies are visited 
by German officers who generally liave in their suite some 
relatives of the colonists. Such was the practice for a number 
of years in the Caucasus, where every spring saw the arrival 
of German officers, with their Jaeger (huntsmen) wliom they 
conKvaBce of generally left behind them in those colonies, and arrived next 
sprmg with another set of Jaeger. Those officers were most 
interested in shooting near the Turkisli frontier wliicli they 
often crossed to visit Turkish oiftcers. Tlie Russian authorities 
saw no harm in that, and were only anxious to give the 
Germans every facility for their sport or study. The 
inliabitants of tlie Caucasus who related this to the writer 
pledged liim to secrecy concerning their names, the revelation 
of whicli would have for consequence their being hunted down 
by those authorities. 

The same passive attitude, if not connivance, of the 
administration has till lately been seen in their not noticing 


how many of those German colonists, Russian subjects, were 
going to serve their time in the German Army, thus getting 
imbued with German patriotism. On the other hand, German 
subjects, selected for their ability by their Government, were 
sent to Russia to seek employment in the State military 
factories. They were forbidden to write about their observa- 
tions to Germany and even to take notes in writing, but were 
bidden to keep all knowledge in their memory and to come to 
Germany to report verbally every two or three years. 

Immeasurable services to Germanism were rendered by German stboon 

in Russia, 

German schools, justly named " fortresses of Germanism " c"ei4anLm'! 
in Russia. German-Russian and purely Russian pupils were 
equally inoculated there with a worship of Germany and a 
contempt for Russia. It is most remarkable that the higher 
Education authorities, often vexatiously interfering with the 
Russian schools, allowed the fullest liberty to the German 
ones. And these were all supported by the Deutsche Schul- 
vereine in Russia, acting on the instructions and with material 
assistance of the Central Direction in Beriin. 

The laisser alter system applied to those Schulvereine The Germans 

•^ '■ '■ invent PaiiSi» 

formed a striking contrast to the continuous hampering of theTursIa' 

i u Goveniineut and 

the work of the patriotic Russian Societies of the so-called cr^on'" ^" 
" Slavophils." The most brilliant success of the German 
policy and the most colossal deceit ever practised in Universal 
History was the labelling of those poor Slavophils with the 
name of Panslavists, thus rendering them an object of distrust 
and suspicion in Russia and of fear and hatred* in Western 

* The unfavourable reputation of the Slavophils in this country is the 
more astonishing in view of their warm admiration for England, whom 
they have always extolled as a perfect national State. And there exists 
in no language a more glowing description of England than in the poem 
of the greatest Slavophil leader, Khomiakoff, "Marvellous Island." 

invent PaiiSiavir.m 
deceiving with it 



In truth, the 
Slavophils aim at 
the liberation of 
Puisia from the 
German yoke. 

Europe. As a matter of fact, there have never been Panslavists 
in Russia, and the verj'' name has never been used there 
except in quoting foreign writers. No Russians ever wanted 
the reunion of other Slavs to Russia, and no agitation in that 
sense has ever been practised in Slavic lands by the Russians.* 
What the Slavophils wanted was to preserve the minor Slav 
nations from Germanization. It is that purpose of theirs 
which rendered them so criminal in German eyes ; and German 
cunning succeeded for a long time in making Englishmen and 
Frenchmen see in those defenders of small nations the worst 
enemies of civilization and humanity. The Slavophils had, 
in truth, another and still more important aim, the defence 
of the Russian nationality and the liberation of Russia from 
the German yoke. Their last great leader, Ivan Aksakoff, 
told the writer that " the Slavophils were unjustly criticized 
in Russia for taking too great an interest in foreign 
Slavs ; they did it chiefly in order, by emphasizing the Slav 
origin of the Russian people, to attain its national independence 
at home." 

Yet another contrast was formed by the absence of any 
restraint of the anti-Russian agitation of Pan-German organs 
in Russia and, up to 1905, the strict and meddling super- 
vision of the national Russian organs of the Press. The 
chief Pan-German newspaper in Russia, organ of the German 
Embassy, the " Deutsche St. Petersburger Zeitung," enjoyed 

* Panslavism in a theoretical sense existed among the weakest and 
most oppressed Slav peoples, e.g., the Slovaks of North W^estern 
Hungary. Austrian Slavs in general used to visit Russia and complain 
of their sutlerings and persecutions, trying to excite sympathy in the 
Russians. They often deplored the apathy of the Russian public, 
which thoy did not succeed in rousing sufficiently. Such was the only 
"Panslavist" agitation which has ever existed. 


even the privileged publication of all official announcements, 
which was equivalent to a large subsidy. The ardent German 
and openly anti-Russian tone of that paper in the first two 
months of the war compelled the Russian Government to 
decide on the suppression of it from January' i {14) 1915, 1^°^™" 


leaving it three months to continue its insolent activity when 
the smallest similar offence by a Russian paper would have 
led to its immediate suppression. 

Generally speaking, since the restoration of the German 
Empire, the Pan-German agitation in Russia has greatly 
increased, while the leniency and even connivance of the 
administration continued unchanged. The national feeUngs 
of Germans in Russia, whether subjects of Germany or of 
Russia, has also grown and become more self-conceited 
(with the laudable exception always of the quite Russified 
German-Russians, particularly those belonging to the Orthodox 
Church or married to Russians). The erection of a statue to ^"^.'^^t^** 
Bismarck m the German cemetery m Moscow proved to be 
a constant stimulus to Pan-German truculence. Spoiled by 
continual favour and impunity, the Germans feel themselves 
to be a superior race in Russia. That is so in the highest degree 
in the Baltic provinces, in which even since the beginning of 
this war, patriotic Russian demonstrations have been dis- R««'»n patriotic 
persed as offensive to the German Noblesse : on the same the B»itic 
ground, the local Russian and Lettish Press is forbidden 
to express its feehngs. The German language, tliough 
spoken by a small minority, is there still the only one used in 
pubUc life. 

Owing to an extraordinary support at Court and in tlie Sr«m7?f1^e"^ 

Qcrmaii Aicbu- 

Government, as well as to the devotion of all the Germany- »^|'-inat.ptt«ni. 
serving elements in Russia, the position of the German 




CcBBOTkhip ever 

ExceiiiT* regarS 

bbUiu :'iI.:p.i for 
GensMii (usctpti- 

Ambassador in St. Petersburg had acquired an exceptional 
importance. A thousand channels brought him every possible 
information and conveyed his instructions to all parts of 
the Russian Empire. Under Alexander II., the German 
Ambassador, prompted, as he asserted, by his personal attach- 
ment to the Russian Emperor, reported to him supposed 
malevolent and traitorous utterances of Russians in high 
position, who always happened to be unfriendly to Germany. 
In subsequent reigns the German Ambassador arrogated 
to himself a kind of censorship over the Russian Press. Every 
article unfavourable to the German pohcy was instantly 
made a subject of complaint, while grossly insulting articles 
in Gennan newspapers were excused on the plea of the pre- 
tended freedom of the Press in Germany. The Russian 
authorities had grown so anxious to avoid those complaints 
that they came to regard every public expression of distrust 
towards Germany or the Germans as reprehensible. When, 
in 1898, Major-General Zolotareff, professor at the War 
Academy in St. Petersburg, alluded in a speech to the 
abnormally privileged position of Germans in Russia, a detach- 
ment of gendarmes was at once sent to arrest him, and it was 
with much difficulty that his immediate chiefs succeeded 
in having that order cancelled. The distinguished strategist 
was, however, compelled to leave his professorship and 
even the Army. The Germans in Russia were evidently 
above criticism. In 1910, when a lecture on Anglo-Russian 
Relations was to be delivered at the Political Club in St. Peters- 
burg, though it had no reference to Germany, the German 
Ambassador tried to have it forbidden, and not attaining 
tliat object, warned the Russian Foreign Minister and his 
Under-Secretary against their attending that lecture. Both 


statesmen, who intended to be present, found it more prudent 
to keep ENvay. 

Innumerable were the German diplomatic attempts to f^M t° eor'i^°r' 

RdssUo Prers. 

influence the Russian Press, directly through cajoling popular 
writers, and indirectly through disguised offers of money. 
A considerable income was once offered to a member of the 
staff of the most influential Russian organ for " watering " 
the London telegrams of that paper. Its correspondent was 
himself offered "by his sympathizers" the double of his 
salary in case he would "give himself rest," that is, cease 
corresponding. A surer means of influence was, however, ^'i^^ji^^rg^KB 

. . to attract the 

found m the propaganda among the Russian conserva- p's^^n ?i;°"'^»': 

, . ii-ii T • IT-. of Monarcticai 

tives of the necessity to uphold the traditional Russo- "oiwu-jtr. 
German friendsliip, in order to save the monarchy." That ^e' ^JtilS^i* u e 
did not prevent the German Embassy from cultivating ^^^^^^ ^ 
intimate relations with Russian revolutionaries, and even 
from hatching plots which were to spread insurrection in 
Russia simultaneously with the beginning of war with 
Germany.* They failed only because, on the outbreak of war, 
those revolutionaries shrank from co-operating with the enemies 
of their country. Non-Russified German-Russians persisted 
in their hostility against the national Russian policy and the 
friendship between Russia and England wliich it involved. 
A former Russian Ambassador was so entirely carried away 

* After the destruction of the German Embassy in Petrograd, the 
only act of popular fury against Germany in Kusi^ia, there were found 
in a room in which Count Pourtal^s was said to have indulged in 
amateur photography, 16,000 copies of proclamations appealing to 
Russians to rise against the very Government to which the Ambassador 
was accredited. It is now also authentically proved that tho great 
strikes in Petrograd during the French l^esident's visit last July were 
instigated by the same Embassy. 


by his racial feelings as to dare, at a sitting of the Upper 
House, after protestations of loyalty to the Sovereign, 
categorically to blame his foreign policy and boldly assert 
the only right policy for Russia was that of alliance with 
Germany ! 



Period of Progress (1905-1915). 
The first act of personal initiative of Nicholas II. was the The i^ituttve of 

' the Hagoe Cod- 

epoch-making proposal of the Hague Conference. At the ?™'^/^Ptin 
moment it greatly amazed and startled everybody. European 
Liberals claimed the Emperor as one of themselves and 
highly praised his grand humanitarian move. Most Govern- 
ments showed themselves favourably disposed. One, which 
was nourishing thoughts of aggression, persistently blocked 
the way. 

The present moment is least propitious for rendering justice 
to a peace act. Still, one must recognize that the creation of 
the Hague Court is the only concrete step in favour of peace 
which has ever been taken, that it has been of practical service 
in many cases, and that, if as we hope, this war will remove 
the chief obstacle to a lasting peace, aU future development 
of international relations will have to proceed on the lines 
of the proposal of the first Hague Conference. The present 
writer in convinced that, in following in this matter the 
impulses of his heart, the Emperor Nicholas was giving 
expression to the innermost wishes of the Russian people 
who have always been averse from war and in favour of peace. 
The said proposal was the first of the great acts of the national 
Russian policy of this reign. 



PsraoajJ viswa 
of the Emperor 


A-id uat carri;! 

It was but natural that the Sovereign who endeavoured 
to promote peace amongst all Nations should be anxious 
to assure it to his own. His liberal and humane feelings, the 
warmth and sincerit}/ of which always struck those who 
approached him, found their expression in the Manifesto 
of 1903, which contained a clear statement of just and liberal 
principles of government. If they had been taken to heart 
by the Emperor's ministers and conscientiously appUed, 
many of the subsequent troubles would have been avoided. 
Unfortunately the bureaucratic chque did everything in its 
power to prevent their application, supported and stimulated 
in that disastrous work by German influences in and out of 
Russia, The decisions of Nicholas II., however, are always 
deeply matured and inspired by what keen observers of his 
acts term his " historical sense." This latter assertion is 
supported by the Emperor's keen interest in history, mani- 
fested, for instance, by his patronage of historical research, 
particularly by his presiding at meetings of the Historical 
Society. One would probably not err in attributing to the 
Emperor's ever-growing knowledge and understanding of 
history, especially of the history of Russia, the deep and lasting 
character of his decisions. Some of them came quite as a bolt 
from the blue, and yet, having been the results of a many- 
sided study and meditation, they remained irrevocable. 

The Organic Laws of October, 1905, have been much 
criticized by conservatives as well as by liberals, and may be 
very imperfect ; but who can deny that they produced an 
ZVil'ih^ltlL immense improvement in the state of Russia ? They restored, 
in a form adapted to modem conditions, some of the features 
of the ancient regime destroyed by Peter the Great. The 
Council of tlie Empire, one-half of whose members is elected 

The Organic Laws 
of October. 1905. 



by the Zemstvos and the municipalities, is a much improved ; 

Boyarskaia Douma, and is more democratic than most of the ; 

Upper Houses of Western Europe, the hereditary element 

being quite absent. The Douma of the Empire recalls the 

Zemsky Sabor, differing from it by its more democratic 

character. It offers, indeed, the spectacle of the most 

democratic legislature in Europe, for in no other have the 

lower classes such a large number of representatives, many of I 

whom wear the peasants' dress. And it is the only parliament 

of a great power in which Asiatics and Mahomedans are sitting 

side by side with Europeans and Christians, enjoying equal ■ 

rights with them.* Western radicals and socialists who deny 

or under-rate the magnitude of the change in Russia evidently j 

do not realize that, before the October Laws, the fact of one's 

being suspected to be a socialist would have been a motive ' 

for his prosecution, while now there is a legally constituted \ 

socialist-democratic group of Members of the Douma who \ 

state their views freely from its tribune. The right of inter- l^^^^^^i \ 

pellation m the Douma, together with the freedom of the Press, ^'^??^""* ! 

is exercising a most salutary effect on all branches of the ' 

administration. Great and small bureaucrats tell with deep j 

sighs their relatives and friends how impossible, owing to an ' 

eventual disclosure in the Douma or in the Press, are now j 

become all those illegal favours they used to bestow on them. 

Better control of the administration and the changed spirit j 

of the Government in general account for the reduced inter- 
ference with private enterprise and business of all kinds. This 


• Asiatics and Mussulmans have always enjoyed in the Russian Empire 
all the rights of other citizens, without any discrimination due to their 
religion or origim. Mussulman generals commanded Russian troops 
and an Armenian Loris-Melikoff, was Prime Minister. 


allows a greater display of activity, stimulates to more energetic 
efforts, encourages savings, and has in fact largely con- 
tributed to a wondenul economic revival. Russia has not 
only quickly recovered the losses incurred through a disastrous 
war and internal troubles, but has attained a degree of 
prosperity she had never known before. 
^^^<^« It is also since the introduction of the new regime that a 

pea.suite and ito 

saJotAry effect*, rcform has been brought about of the deepest economical, 
social and political significance, namely, the passing of peasants 
from communal to individual land-ownership. When the serfs 
were emancipated, land was not given to them individually, 
but to the village commune, an institution the origin of which 
is hidden in the darkest ages. To most Russians the commune 
seemed to be an exclusively Russian institution, a part of their 
nationality. It required a deep conviction of the necessity of 
the reform to undertake it, and a clever handling to carry 
it through successfully. The commune was not abolished; 
its members were only allowed to choose between remaining 
in it or becoming individual landowners, in which case the 
State would come to their aid. The immediate consequences 
of that measure clearly proved its beneficence. The possession 
of his own plot of land exercises a powerful influence on the 
peasant ; it transforms him into an independent working 
unit, enterprising, self-controlled and progressive. It is per- 
missible to attribute that reform to the personal initiative of 
the Emperor, who always shows a warm interest in the 
welfare of the peasantry, who are by far the most numerous 
class of the Russian people. 

According to the latest information received by the writer 
from authoritative sources, the peasants, with the assistance 
of the Ministry of Land Organization, are eagerly, as in Ireland, 


buying up, by mutual goodwill, the lands of the gentry ; 
who now, as they mostly live in towns, have less opportunity 
to look after their property in the country. A class of small erauati^n^of 


landowners is thus growing up which will constitute a new 
and important element in the Russian Nation, giving it a 
decidedly democratic character, recalling that of the primitive 
communities of the Slavs of Russia. 

The same Ministry is also managing the colonization of ^^,j?oT^"° 


Siberia, making grants of land to such immigrants as are able 
to cultivate it. The number of these settlers from European 
Russia of late years annually amounted to half a milUon ; 
in 1913 it rose to a whole million. Compare the peopling of 
Siberia with that of another rapidly growing country, Canada, 
and you find that, while in 1906 the population of Canada was 
larger than that of Siberia, in igii Siberia had already two 
million inhabitants more than Canada ; and the increase has 
since been maintained. The explanation lies in the proximity 
to and the quick growth of the population of European Russia, 
but also in the able and consistent way in which the wiU of 
the Emperor is carried out by the Minister of Land 
Organization, Mr. Krivosheine, whose successful labours are 
forming a fine page in the history of the Russian 

The second period of the present reign in Russia is marked ^^^^'"« 
in foreign affairs by the completion of Alexander III.'s work 
in carrying out Peter the Great's plan of an alliance of Russia 
with France and England, which may be called his Unwritten 
Testament. The Triple Entente has in the seven years of its 
existence proved to be the most pacific grouping of Powers 
which has ever been. It might justly be called tlie Pacifist 
Entente. Nothing could, in truth, equal their readiness to 


accept the most fallacious assurances of the aggressors, to 
overlook facts which gave these assurances the lie, and to 
make all kinds of concessions, in order to preserve at least a 
formal peace. It fell to the lot of Russia to surpass even her 
i^n™ MdRJ^S°a'i partners in meekness towards Germany. She yielded, in 1909, 
to an insolent demand such as Russia had never received from 
anyone since she threw off the Mongol yoke.* And she patiently 
bore William II. 's impudent public boastings about Germany's 
" shining armour." The entirely one-sided Agreement of 191 1. 
by which Russia recognized the Bagdad line as a German 
Government's undertaking, and pledged herself to build a 
railway which would facilitate the German competition with 
the Russian trade in Persia, was a climax of pacifism never 
before attained by any powerful nation. 
p?^?9^Mtl^ged The submission of the Triple Entente to Austria's require- 
rJ^^I^F,^'^ < , ments — the creation of the State of Albania and the exclusion 

to plac9 the r t^ 

S?i*!^.,;?<*" of Serbia from the coast of the Adriatic — was the direct 

t'jeir yoke. 

cause of the second war between the Balkan Powers. The 
heightened self-confidence of the Germanic Powers determined 
them, under a false pretext,t to attempt to subjugate Serbia 
and to establish their domination over the Balkan Peninsula. 
Thus it turned out that the very conciHatory and yielding 
policy of the Pacifist Entente, pushed to an extreme, led to 
the conflagration which it had been endeavouring by all means 

* It has been rumoured that, at the meeting of the Council of Ministers 
presided over by the Emperor, he alono inclined to resistance, and only 
reluctantly accorded his sanction to the Ministers' conclusions. 

t The fact that both the actual murderers of the heir of Austria were 
exempted from the capital punishment inflicted on those who were but 
indirectly concerned in the crime confirms all that was, indeed, widely 
known before ; namely, that the murder was not due to Pan-Serbian 
agitation, but to the divergencies within the Hapsburg monarchy itself 
and its dynasty. 



to avoid ! This had, on tiie other side, the inestimable advantage i 

of unmistakeably showing to the world who it was that wanted i 

war and why the war was taking place. Germany and Austria j 

became the prey of the gods who bhnd those whom they wish ; 

to destroy. j 

The declaration of war by Germany brought about a com- S^'^el"'^'' "" i 

Roisla j 

plete change in the attitude of the Russian Government. 

In rapid succession, one after another, were issued radical j 

decisions of the Sovereign, enthusiastically welcomed by the 

whole nation. The suddenness of those decisions ought net i 

to induce us to think they were taken on the spur of the 

moment. Thev were matured long ago by the Ruler of Russia. Mom-jatooB j 

and kept in suspense to be applied at the right moment. They 

all bore a profoundly historic character, and were all based ' 

on a thorough knowledge of Russian history ; they settled ] 

questions which had been pending for over two hundred ' 

3'ears. Although universally known, their immense importance 

renders it necessary to make clear the full significance of each 

of them. 

Russia has been at war with Prussia and with Austria '\ 

alternately ; and once, in 1812,* with all the German States 

together, yet no one of those wars was essentially a Russo- 1 

German struggle ; the Russians took part in the Seven Years' rir^t Eai*, I 

War only as Allies of one or the other of the chief antagonists, "X^tl^^t j 


just as in the war of 1812, the Germans acted only as , 

Napoleon's Allies. In most of the wars of Russia against \ 

European States, she was allied to one or all of the Germanic | 


• The best Austrian General Schwartzenberg with 30,000 of his be^t | 

troops (the equivalent of which would be now at least 600,000) invaded I 

South-western Russia and advanced on Kieff. His plan made so deep | 

an impression on the Austrian Staff General that it has been adopted j 
for the present Austrian campaign against Russia. 




Rupture with 
tbc Ganc&n 

National BusaiAu 

Ub«r«tioB ot 
the Btav? 

Uolty &nd auto 
uemy of Poland. 

Powers and fought chiefly for their defence or in their interest. 
Now, for the first time, Russia and Germany are fighting each 
other in a hfe and death struggle. 

This fact was strongly emphasized by an open rupture 
between the Reigning House of Russia and the German 
dynasties who, for over two centuries, had been bound together 
by many ties of relationship and friendship. All Russians 
have joyously saluted that event, which puts an end to those 
real or imagined German influences in the highest circles 
that had so long been distressing them. The Russian people 
are now feeling themselves the more closely bound to their 
national dynasty, and their attachment to it has grown in 
equal degree. 

This freeing of Russia from any regard for German opinion 
rendered at last possible the declaration of the true Russian 
national policy. It is that of the so long misjudged and 
persecuted Slavophils. The Imperial War Manifesto expressly 
stated that Russia was about to fight, not for herself alone, 
but also for our brethren, the other Slavs, Russia had done 
so several times before, but no mention of it ever appeared 
in any official document, as the Russian Government, out 
of regard for Germany, studiously avoided it. The present 
writer, himself, with many others, heard in October, 1876, 
in a haU of the Imperial Palace of Moscow, Alexander II. 
addressing the Moscow Noblesse and praising the Russian 
volunteers in Serbia ** who proved in shedding their own 
blood their devotion to tlie Slav cause." The bureaucrats 
were appalled by the Emperor's address, and, fearful lest the 
words, " Slav cause," might give offence to Germany, sup- 
pressed them in all reports of the Imperial visit to Moscow. 

A war for the liberation of all Slavs could not be consistently 


waged by Russia while it kept in subjection the most numerous 
of the non-Russian Slavs. The proclamation of the Supreme 
Commander-in-Chief, guaranteeing the Poles national unity 
and automony, is the first step on the path of that liberation. 
The Slavophils always advocated the granting to Poland, 
not only autonomy, but even independence. The Poles them- 
selves, however, are opposed to the latter, for it would involve 
the loss of the vast Russian market for their flourishing 
industry, and prove the economic ruin of their country. The 
great obstacle to reconciliation has ever been the claim of 
Polish politicians to the provinces which had belonged to 
Poland before its partition, but where the Noblesse alone was 
Polish. It appears, however, that the Poles do not pretend 
any longer to impose their nationality on non-Polish 
populations. Their representatives in the Douma have 
declared, without conditions or reservations, that " the Poles 
will be with the Slavs." The Poles in general decline to put 
forward any demands as long as this war lasts. It is known, 
nevertheless, from private utterances of their foremost leaders, 
that they would be satisfied if all districts with over 50 per 
cent, of Polish nationality were included in the autonomous 

The heroic conduct of the Poles, who do not shrink from any fe^cuuuo 
sacrifice in the defence of the Empire against the common 
foe, strongly appeals to the Russians. It proves to them 
that Russians can trust Poles as Poles trust Russians. Both 
Slav peoples have at last realized that their fratricidal struggle 
was chiefly fomented by the traditional enemy of tiieir race. 
All the most offensive measures tending towards the 
denationalization of the Poles have been conceived and 
attempted by the German-Russian Governors-General, whose 


and mntaal 


systematic Russification of Poland consisted principally in 
the plantation of those German colonies which were the 
vanguard of the German attack on Russia, as this war has 
convincingly demonstrated. 
t!^^I^^%e Loyalty to the Empire characterizes the conduct of all the 
t«irtiee In RuMia nationalities, as also of aU the parties, in the whole of Russia. 
However great and seemingly well-founded had been the 
motives for dissatisfaction on the part of certain portions 
of the population, they dwindled to almost nothing the moment 
the fate of the Empire was at stake. The Finns do not form 
an exception. Finnish volunteers in the Russian Army, and 
hospitals for wounded Russians, organized by the Finns in 
Finland, prove that the Finnish people has not listened to a few 
agitators acting under German influence. This loyal attitude 
of the Finns will certainly help finally to settle the position of 
Finland in the Russian Empire satisfactorily for both sides. 
o'i"«ii^'^«"^'"' -^^ Russian politicians of to-day agree in believing any 
t'i^'xo'Kow'a increase of heterogeneous elements m Russia proper to be 
contrary to Russian national interest, and m considenng 
the existence of an autonomous Finland and of an autonomous 
Poland as conforming with that interest. Therein lies the 
best guarantee for the maintenance of those autonomies, as 
well as against the annexation by Russia of any territories 
with a non-Russian population. 
^'jinoc* One of the most popular among the latest Imperial decisions 

of Beta. was the Russincation of the name of the capital. It symbolized 

the end of the German domination in Russia and the begin- 
ning of a national period of Russian history. But it is only 
the first step towards the de-Germanization of Russia. To 
defeat the German armies, to break the power of Germany 
is comparatively an easier task than to pull out the innumerable 



iangs of Germanism, which had systematically fastened 

themselves into Russia, like the tentacles of an octopus, i 

clutching its intended prey. One of the leaders of the Russian I 

national thought wrote lately to the writer : — " We are 

still living in ' Russlandia/ ' Rossia ' (Russia) is yet to be 

created 1" i 

That view is unfortunately justified by the more or less llJiJ^"'^"' ; 

, . , . . ,^ elements. j 

disguised resistance which the intentions of the Government, 

warmly supported by public opinion, are meeting with on \ 

the part of certain bureaucratic, financial, commercial and 

other circles whose interests have become dependent on the 

continuation of the German influence. To extirpate the results 

of the Gennan pacific penetration is not found easy, even in 

the countries where it has been methodically pursued since i 

the day of the restoration of the German Empire. It must 

needs be infinitely more difficult in Russia, where that ■ 

penetration began with Peter the Great's "Reform," and where ■ 

for more than two hundred years the Germans occupied a * 

predominant position at Court and in the Government, and ; 

were treated as a superior race, entitled to every kind of ! 

privilege denied to all other peoples of the Empire. Russia i 

can be de-Germanized only by a determined, unrelenting, 

systematic action of the Government with an energetic 

organized concurrence of all Russian citizens. The complete i 

de-Gemianization of Russia is the only efficient safeguard i 

against a return of the German influence which would endanger 

not only the national independence of Russia, but also that of i 

all Europe. | 

A great reform, utterly unconnected with politics, but of a 2f°^lXf' ""''° 
liygicnic and sociological character, is exercising just now an i 

immense influence on the economical, political and even i 


military situation of Russia, and is legitimately expected to 
exercise an ever-growing influence on the destinies of that 
Empire. In the rescript appointing M. Bark as Finance 
Minister, the Emperor Nicholas expressed that, on his Majesty's 
journeys across Russia, he had been struck by the great 
harm caused to the People by the vice of drunkenness, and that 
he had resolved that the State should no longer get profit 
from it through the State monopoly of alcoholic drinks. The 
prohibition movement had existed in Russia for some time 
already. Its partisans eloquently pleaded that it was chiefly 
drunkenness which kept the Russians behind other peoples 
of Europe, and that it was increasingly undermining their 
physical constitution and conducting them to economical 
and social ruin. Everyone agreed about the harmfulness of 
that national vice, but many practical politicians. Members 
of both Houses of ParHament and others, argued that the State 
was not able suddenly to renounce so large a source of income, 
that a total abstinence could not be observed by the people 
so much accustomed to the use of alcohol — which, indeed, 
in moderate proportion, was necessary on account of the 
cHmate — and finally, that a rigid enforcement of the pro- 
hibition would be difiicult to maintain and might excite a 
dangerous dissatisfaction in the masses. It is hardly probable 
that the reform would ever have been attempted had not 
the idea of it suggested itself to the observing mind of the 
Autocrat of All the Russias who resolved himself to take the 

The decision to give up the largest item of revenue at the 
moment of entering on a gigantic war, necessitating a 
tremendous expenditure, as well as a radical change, in a 
habit of the whole nation, was indeed heroic, and surpassing 


in boldness any reform that has ever been undertaken. Six 
months have elapsed since the issue of the decree of pro- 
hibition, and none of the evil consequences foreseen by prudent 
and experienced statesmen has occurred. The income from ^TiJ.'l^^l^f'^ 
the taxes of the country did not drop, but on the contrary, 
rose considerably over that of the preceding year, 1913. 
According to official reports, the revenue expected last 
December was surpassed by almost one-fifth. The productive- 
ness of the people increased between 30 and 40 per cent. The 
savings too were increased largely ; in last December alone, 
by £2,834,700. 

From several trustworthy private sources the writer learns 
that the half-year of the prohibition has already resulted 
in a remarkable rise of the standard of hving of the lower i** ^^p c<« 
classes, who, with the money they used to squander on 
drinks, can afford to be better fed and better clothed than 
before. Instead of the expected resistance or dissatisfaction, 
there reigns everywhere, particularly among the peasants, 
a deep feehng of contentment with having got rid of such 
an inveterate and pernicious habit, also of gratitude to the 
Sovereign who imposed his will in that grave matter for the 
benefit of the people.* This heightened welfare and activity, 
as well as the consciousness of a successful exercise of their 
self-control, greatly increases the confidence of the Russians 
in the triumph of their efforts in the present war. 

* In the sitting of the Douma of January 29 (February 11) last, a 
Member speaking on behalf of the Peasant Members of the Douma, 
a peasant himself, declared that, after the prohibition, " the population 
is become healthy, the number of the jioor has decreased, the temples 
of God have become full of people, peace and quiet reign in family 
life, criminal trials and law-suits have diminished by half, the young 
generation is growing morally stronger." 



Recapitulation and Conclusions. 

The two msla- 
p;,nngs cf Ruwia, 
Democracy aL(i 


In our brief survey of ten and a half centuries of Russian 
liistory we have, through all the evolutions of Russia, seen the 
working of two main principles. Democracy and Monarchy. 

It was of their own free will that the Russian Democracy 
founded Monarchy when they appealed to Rurik to secure 
peace and order in their country. It was again by their free 
choice that the Russian people restored Monarchy when they 
elected as Tsar Michel Romanoff. There have never been 
conflicts between Monarchy and Democracy in Russia. All 
popular movements were in the name of the Tsar and against 
the partition wall which arose between him and his people, 
which it was as much in the interest of the Tsar as of the people 
to destroy. In their darkest thraldom the Russian people 
were always comforted by the Ideal grown up in the popular 
mind of a People's Tsar from whom they hoped to get freedom 
and justice. 

Such a partition wall in the Moscow period was formed by 
the aristocracy. Peter the Great, who completely broke it, 
might have become a true People's Tsar. Unfortunately he 
was impelled by his genius to seek a rapid attainment to power 
and prosperity for Russia at the price of an immediate com- 
pulsory change in her entire mode of existence. Materially 
his work was crowned with success. Tlie Empire he founded 


quickly grew up to be immensely vast, populous and mighty. i 

But it lost the vivifying spirit of nationality. In the St. !. 

Petersburg period the Emperors were separated from the i 

people by a new and formidable wall, the Germanized < 

bureaucracy. This bureaucracy acted arbitrarily and did not ^"*j^"J'2';;,''y j 

let the voice of the people reach the Sovereign. And the ' 
bureaucrats consistently favoured the penetration of Russia 

by the Germans, gave them the position of a ruling race there j 

and placed the power of the Russian Empire at the service j 

of the German cause, until Germany was unified and became ■ 
the dominant Power in Europe. 

The Russian national revival began with the literary move- nvs-i-vnuiuonui i 
ment which awakened national consciousness and created 
public opinion. Both currents of it, the Liberal and the 

National, were essentially democratic and strove against J 

the bureaucracy who tried to keep the Sovereign apart from j 

the people. However, in spite of the precautions of the i 

bureaucrats, the Tsars learned to know the true situation and i 


took themselves the initiative of the reforms which the people j 

desired. Alexander II. laid a broad basis for the ?»> tjbv, t. i 

democratization of the Russian State. Alexander III. Russified ' 

the foreign policy of Russia. Nicholas II. carried his grand- \ 
father's and his father's work tlirough to a high degree. And 
in allowing the wishes of the people to reach his ears by the 
voice of their elected representatives, as well as by that of a 
free Press, the Emperor placed himself in direct communication 

with the people, and practically broke down the partition ] 

wall. j 
Russia is described in the " Almanach de Gotha " as jomii th-. n.m . 

* Monarchie Consiitulionnelle sous un Empcreur Aulocraie." lurop/ ^ 1 

It might with equal justice be called " Democratic Monarchy " ' 



The Ronl&n 

rn* pabUc 

or " Monarchical Democracy." In no other country' of Europe 
is the aristocratic element so weak as in Russia. There is no 
peerage and no representation of aristocracy in the Upper 
House. There is no right of primogeniture, and upon a father's 
death, his fortune is equally divided among all his sons, his 
daughters receiving a smaller share. (In practice it is often 
rendered equal to the sons' share.) Titles are inherited by ail 
sons and daughters, and are therefore so multiplied that the 
bearing of a title does not necessarily indicate any superiority 
of position. The Russian Noblesse has no necessary' connection 
with landed property, and since the emancipation of the 
serfs, especially since the agrarian troubles of ten years ago, 
the majority of the former gentry- live in towns. Hereditary 
Noblesse is automatically acquired with the grade of Colonel 
in the Army and that of Conseiller de College in the Civil 
Service. There is besides a numerous "personal" Noblesse 
acquired hy low ex ichivs (grades or degrees). Nothing astonishes 
Russians more when they visit Western Europe than the 
important position held there by the aristocracy even in 
countries claimin^^ to be democratic ; repubUcan France, 
for instance, possesses a more sohd aristocracy than Russia. 

The most important class in Russia is the peasantry, which 
forms 90 per cent, of the whole population. The peasants 
who know that, through the guilt of the aristocracy, they 
had fallen in bondage and have been released by the Tsar, 
and who, moreover, have seen themselves ever since the object 
of special Imperial solicitude, are boundlessly devoted to the 
Tsar, and constitute a most solid foundation of Russian 
Monarchy. Perfect loyalty to the Emperor is general in all 
other classes. Public opinion certainly demands a consistent 
development of the Russian institutions necessary to make 


Russia a modem State, and criticizes the bureaucracy for 
not fully carr}'ing out the liberal measures of the Sovereign ; 
the Press particularly complains of the bureaucrats' continued 
partiality for the German element in Russia. However, the 
confidence inspired by the whole trend of the policy adopted 
by the Emperor gives the progressive movement a steady 
and moderate character. 

The Russian revolutionarv movement has never been a ^« «'>-cau«<i 

re TolutioiMkrlfiS. 

popular one. It was limited to groups of intellectuals acting 
under the influence of German socialistic and anarchist writers 
and agitators. When those revolutionaries wanted to incite 
the masses to acts of violence against property, they employed 
forged proclamations in the name of the Tsar commanding 
the people to do so. They aimed at abolishing individual 
property and destroying the present organization of society ; 
they would, with equal bitterness, have fouglit a non- 
socialistic republic. Tlieir criminal attempts against persons 
in high position, which excited universal abhorrence, were 
greatly due to the instigation and assistance of the enemies 
of Russia as a nation. It has lately been asserted that, on the 
declaration of war by Germany, the revolutionary leaders 
refused to listen to the suggestions of the German Ambassador incited to icnu- 

o" rf'-ui'D by the 

•r-, t 1 • 1 . ■ • • Germftn 

in retrograd, who was urgmg them to organize msurrectionarj' Amb»»«Kior. 
risings, and that these leaders broke off all relations with the 
enemies of their countr}'. It is certain that on the very 
evening when that declaration became knowTi in the Russian 
capital the workmen who were taking part in a seditious 
manifestation spontaneously began singing " God save the 
Tsar," and aU the strikers resumed work next day. Whatever 
be^the conduct of a few individuals, it seems that an over- 
wliclming wave of patriotism swept over most of the agitators. 




Tbe ideal of the 
Psople's Taar 

TTi^rn of a'J 

The Baialan 
Dumorracy and 
Mooarchy India- 
aoiiilj'.y n:i't.uil. 

who at once, like other Russians, concentrated all their 
thoughts on the longing for the victor^'' for Russia. 

The task of the present reign is still far from being completed. 
No substantial progress can be made in many reforms which 
are universal^ recognized as necessar}^ until this great War 
is terminated. However, the reforms already achieved or 
initiated constitute a wonderful co-ordinate series of great 
acts of a manifestly great reign. Above all, they plainl}' show 
that the Ideal which the Russian people have borne in their 
hearts for so many centuries is at last realized : the Russians 
have found the People's Tsar ! 

No one could deny that by his latest decisions the Emperor 
Nicholas II. has united all parties and nationalities of the 
Russian Empire as they have never been united before. There 
are in Russia at present no revolutionaries and no reaction- 
aries, but only Russians. 

That fact is of the lughcst importance, not only for Russia 
herself, but also for her Allies, for the issue of the present 
War and for the future destinies of Europe. 

The President of the Douma rightly said in the historical 
sitting of February nth: — "This is the will of Russia." 
Everything we see and hear strengthens the conviction that 
the whole Russian Nation is unshakeable in its resolve to 
continue the War until all the Slavs are liberated, until the 
question of Russia's access to the open sea is settled, and 
until the legitimate interests of all our Allies are satisfied. 

The sharp medicine of war is rapidly and thoroughly curing 
Russia of the German virus wliich for two centuries has 
poisoned the organism of that Empire. The Russian Democracy 
is at last coming to its oivn again. Its union with Monarchy 
is indissolubly cemented and consecrated by the wise leadership 
of the great Slavic Tsar. 



With the writing of the preceding lines the writer considered 
the task which he had set before himself as accomplished. 
He hears, however, from an English friend of Russia, whose 
opinion has a great value in the writer's eyes, that it would 
be worth while to add a further statement concerning the 
direction into which, after this war, Russia with her increased wui not victonow 

dftn^drous tiria 

power and prestige, would turn her strength. Those who cemany? 
know her well — saj's the above-mentioned friend of Russia — • 
believe that it will not be outwards, but to the development 
of her own resources. The Germans, and their conscious and 
unconscious helpers, however, are straining every means in 
their power to spread tlie apprehension that Russia will take 
the place of Germany as a dominant military Power and 
constitute an even greater danger for peace and liberty than 
has hitherto been Germany. 

The writer is quite willing to follow the suggestion made '■^JjP7<"'g''f<"«*'^ 
in the mutual interest of both the Allied Nations, but he finds peace*' 
this additional task very much narrowed in consequence of 
an authoritative and impressive statement, which renders 
it superfluous to assure the British public of the Russian love 
of peace in the past and in the present. Mr. Lloyd George, 
than whom no one possesses the power of summing up in fewer 
and clearer words the whole substance of a question, stated 


in liis speech at Bangor, on February 28th, that he doubted 
if Russia ever made an aggressive war on her European 
neighbours, and added : — " Russia desired above everything 
peace." " She wanted peace, she needed peace, she would 
have had peace, had she been left alone." " She was at the 
beginning of a great industrial development, and she wanted 
peace in order to bring it to its full fructification. She had 
repeatedly stood insolences at the hands of Gennany up to 
the point of humiliation, all for peace, and anything for 
peace." " Never was a nation so bent on preserving peace 
as Russia was." 

That testimony appears to the writer to need no 
corroboration and to admit of no controversy. The only 
point which might conceivably be raised now is whether, under 
the influence of "increased power and prestige," Russia would 
not be tempted to imitate the ambitions of Germany. 
o"HlTJ'd"e''t^' The writer hopes to have shown that, after the recovery of 

eermxil inf nesce. 

her own shores — a geographical, economic and cultural necessity 
— all the European wars of Russia were due to German influence 
and served German ends to the detriment of Russian interests. 
They were entirely condemned by the Russian national 
conscience. The only wars which the Russian people approved 
^b^«w<J^*^ ^^ ^^^ longed for were the wars for the liberation of their 

EtuUrn Chr'.Fti".ii 

^HnYiSSili.'^ bretliren of creed and race, the Russian Crusades. Both these 
motives must needs disappear with the termination of the 
present war. As Russia will not cease fighting until all Eastern 
Christians as well as all Slavs are liberated, this war will be 
her last Crusade. And it is unthinkable that Russia should 
ever make war again to serve the purposes of Germany. 

^p^""^"* Moreover, all Russian parties are agreed that the annexation 

of any country with a non-Russian population would be most 

ajinoxatloij of 
son Ruuian 

approval is 
Russia of Polish 


undesirable. The only annexation which is regarded as 
acceptable is that of Eastern Galicia and Western Bucovina, 
inhabited by the Little Russian branch of the Russian nation- 
ality. That extension of territory will, however, be more 
than counterbalanced by the separation from Russia proper 
of an autonomous Poland. Thus, while the territory of the 
whole Empire will be increased by the reunion to Poland of 
the Polish provinces of Prussia and Austria, that of Russia 
proper will be diminished. This notwithstanding, no act of 
the Emperor, after the declaration of war on Germany, 
has been more unanimously welcomed by the Russian 
people than the restoration of national existence to Poland. 
This is evidently the reverse of aiming at conquests, ^"^^oraj 
And the sentiment shown on that occasion by the Russians 
is entirely in accordance with the well-understood interest 
of Russia. Nothing could render her Western frontier so safe 
as her having for neighbours friendly peoples, most of whom 
will owe to Russia their national existence and unity. 

A free access to the open sea in the South, another vital Rns^sia .atufled 

^ vath free access 

necessity of the economic development of Russia, will be a iu the°sonth!* 
natural compensation for the immeasurable efforts and 
sacrifices made by Russia in the defence of the liberty and 
independence of Europe. That will also answer an equally 
vital need for the supply of corn to Western European States. 

In the North, Russia's interests are identical with those of f "Non^e™ sSm 

Identical with 

other Baltic and North Sea States ; it is as essential for her si^^*,"^ "***'■ 
as for them that, on those seas, there should be no aggressive 
predominance on the part of any power and that personal 
and commercial traffic should always be free and safe from 
piracy. One of the most successful German intrigues has been 
the creation of a panic in Sweden on account of an imaginarj' 


Russian invasion. It took Russians considerable time to 
realize that such a mare's nest found credit with such sensible 
and shrewd people as the Swedes generally are. Not the 
slightest indication in support of it could be discovered in the 
acts of the Russian Government or in the language of the 
Russian Press. All Russian politicians, whatever shade of 
opinion they belonged to, who have had an opportunity of 
stating their views on the matter, have been unanimous in 
repudiating those rumours, and in protesting that Russia 
had neither the wish to encroach on Scandinavian territor}'" 
nor any interest in doing so. Fortunately, it appears that the 
Swedes themselves sifted the legends fabricated in Germany 
and found at last they were nothing but absurd inventions.* 

The absence in the future of the motives which had 
determined a warlike policy on the part of Russia in the past, 
the satisfaction, in agreement with her Allies, of the legitimate 
claims of Russia, and the existence, in all political circles, 
as well as in the public opinion of Russia, of a decided and 
unanimous opposition to any expansion which involves an 
inclusion into Russia of non-Russian elements, offer quite 
soauent^gimran^ Sufficient guarautccs against a pursuit of conquests and 
a'dattTmStaai attcmpts at military domination. To these considerations 

doialnation. ^ •' 

of foreign policy must be added those, stiU more powerful, 
of Russian domestic policy. 

* The sight, on their arrival in Sweden, of Russian civilians, mostly 
women and children, who had been detained and grossly ill-treated in 
Germany, strongly appealed to the natural kindliness of the Swedes 
and moved them to give every possible help to these innocent victims 
of Teuton brutality. These acts of kindness, which greatly alleviated 
the sufferings of tlie poor Russian travellers returning to their country, 
kindled in tlie hearts of all Russians feelings of lasting gratitude and 
regard for the Swedish people and Sweden. 


The present war has surprised Russia amidst momentous f,.^/^"ibro<^ ^ 

the retorms 

poUtical, economic and social reforms, some of which had jntemipfcea by 
only just been inaugurated, and the full achievement of all of 
which is absolutely indispensable for her welfare and prosperity. 
Some of these reforms have been spoken of in the course of 
this work, as, for example, the passing of the peasantry, 
that is, of the 90 per cent, of the whole population, from 
communal to individual landownership and the peopling of 
Siberia, a country three times larger than the whole of 
European Russia. Besides these, there are others whicii do 
not yield to them in importance — the organization on a new 
basis of industry and of commerce, the general reform of 
education and particularly of technical education, the develop- 
ment of the local, municipal and provincial self-government, 
the regularization of the co-operation between both Houses 
of Parliament, as well as between each of them and all 
brandies of the Government. 

All these reforms, and one or two more, must needs be Th« injur^nMb-.a 

tas'i of uprooBm^; 

carried through in one and the same spirit. They all must fnnusnieta Russia. 

systematically tend to eradicate from the organism and life 

of Russia all traces of the German poison whicii had so long 

arrested and perverted the economic and moral progress of 

Russia. Until the task of a complete de-Gennanization is 

accomplished, Russia will not be quite safe from a return of 

German influence and from renewed attempts to restore 

Gennan domination. Legislative and administrative measures 

alone will not prove sufficient. There must be above all a ^^Xth'^t^nLiixi 

. . . . , culture. 

full display of the free activities of the Russian people, an 
untrammelled growth of Russian national culture which 
has for two centuries been repressed and penalized by the 
Germanized bureaucracy. 


The Anglo Franco- Jhis will be tlic tinc coiitinuation of the work of Peter the 

KiUEuin Alli&nce 

at a basis of the . _ , . 

R^^i^ th"'' °^ Great, misunderstood and mishandled by his successors. As 

RoaaU ii: tk« 

he sought assistance for raising the prosperity and civilization 
of Russia in close connection with England and France, so 
is the present Emperor also doing politically, economically 
and culturally. The political alliance planned by the great 
Peter is already most fully attained. Efforts are being made 
and must be made more closely to knit both fronts of the 
Grand Alliance, the Western and the Eastern, by material 
and intellectual ties. That Alliance, which gives satisfaction 
to the legitimate claims of each of its members, totally 
excludes on the part of any one the spirit of predominance 
or conquest. 
punditmentai All Russla Is acclaimiug and will continue to acclaim this 

dinerence between " 

tto RuEEian f-ieaiB. new couceptiou. There exists between the German and the 
Russian ideals a fundamental difference. " Pangermanismus " 
means the subjection of all nations to the German rule. 
" Slavianojilstvo," mistranslated by the Germans as Pan- 
slavism, means the liberation of all the Slavs, the Russians 
included, from the German yoke and the free development 
of the Slavic nations beside the Latin and the Teutonic in 
abiding and harmonious progress. 

G. DE Wesselitsky. 



Absolute power, 4, 7 
Absolutism, 4 
Adrianople, Treatj- of, 30 
Akerman, 59 
Aksakoff, Ivan, 64 
Albania, 74 
Alexander I., 7, 20-26 
Alexander II., 19. 28, 37-48, 54, 
66, 83 

Alexander III.. 19. 49-53. 54- 55. 

Alliance of the Three Emperors, 

49. 50 
Andrassy, 44 

Anglo-Franco-Ruasian Alliance. 9 
Anna, Empress, 14 
Araktcheyeff, 25 
Aristocracy, 4. 5. 84 
Armenian, 71 
Asiatics in Russia, 71 
Austria, 9. 18, 22, 24, 30, 32. 41, 

42, 44. 46, 47, 48, 50, 74, 75 

Austrian Slavs, 64 
Autocracy, 4 
Autocrat of Russia, 55 

Bagdad line. 56, 74 

Balkan crisis, 43-47 

Balkan peoples, 32, 47 

Balkans, 36, 42 

Baltic German barons, ir, 58 

Baltic Provinces, 11, 21, 39, 58 

Baltic States, 90 

Bark, M., 80 

Bennigsen, 28 

Berlin, 15, 36, 50 

Berlin Congress, 46, 47 

Berlin Government, 56 

Bessarabia, 59 

Biron, 14, 20, 25 

Bismarck, 41, 43. 44. 45- 4^'. 47 

48, 49. 50. 65 
Boris Godounofi, 6. 17. 35 
Bosnia, 45. 47 
Bosphorus, 3^. 5^ 
Boyars, 5, 7 
Boyarskaia Douma, 4, 71 
Brandenburg, 15 
Brunnow, Baron. 28 
Bucovina, 89 
Bulgaria, 45. 46, 50 
Bureaucracy, 16. 39, 71. 83, 85 

Canada, 73 

Catherine, Grand Duchess, 21 

Catherine the Great, 10, 16-19, 20, 

28, 40, 41 

Caucasus, 62 

Church of Russia, 4. 7, 39 

Colonization, German. 17, 58, 59, 

Commission for the framing of 

laws, 16, 17 
Conservatism, Period of, 54 
Constantinople, 31 
Constitution, 22, 24 
Cossacks, 5. (> 
Courland, 24 
Crimea, 15 

Crimean War, i, 33, 38 
Croats, 32 

Dalmatia, 44 
Dardanelles, 31 
Danube, 21 



Decembrists, 26 
De-Germanization of Russia, 78, 79, 

Democracy, i, 3, 82, 83, 84 86 
Denmark, 31 
Dessiatines, 18 
Dimitri, 6 

Dissent, Dissenters, 8, 39 
Dixon, Hepworth, 40 
Dnieper, 5. 24 
Don, 5 

Doama, 39. 59. 71. 11. Si, 86 
Drang nach Osten, 18 

Eastern Christians, 9, 18, 29, 88 

East Russia, 15 

Egypt, 30 

Elbe Duchies, 31 

Elizabeth, Empress, 14 

Emancipation of the Serfs, 37 

England, i. 9. 29. 30, 43. 5", ^3. 73. 

Estbonia, n, 24 

Finland, 40, 77 

Finns, 78 

France, 9. 21. 29. zo, 43, 50, 56, 73, 

Francis Joseph, 44 
Frankfort Parliament, 31 
Frederick II., 15. 18 
Frederick William li., 21 

Galicia, 89 

George, Lloyd, 87 

Germanic Cabinets, Powers, States, 

i(), 18, 29, 31, 32, 41, 74, 75 
Germanism, ij, 30. 52, 58, 63 
Germanization of Russia, 60, §4 
Germanized bureaucracy, 25, 35, 

77. 83 
German dynasties, 11 
German (Government, 51, 57, 63 
Germanophil, 49. 5^ 
German princes and princesses, 11 

Germans in Russia, 13, 14, 15, 27, 

29. 50, 51. 58. 59. ^5. 0(J. 77. 87. 

German schools in Russia, 12 

Germany, 12, 21, 23, 25, 29, 37, 
41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49. 
50, 51. 56, 57. 61, 65, G6, 67, 
75. 76, 87 

Gortchakoff, 41, 42, 49 

Grand Dukes of Russia, 3, 4 

Great Britain, 10, 56 

Greece, 29, 46 

Hague Conference, 69 
Hague Court, 69 
Hapsburg monarchy, 46^ 74 
Hapsburgs, 32 
Hart wig, M., 36 
Herzegovina, 44. 45. 47 
Hilferding, 35 
Hohenzollerns, 3^ 
Holstein, Duke of, 15 
Holy Alliance, 22 
Hungary, 31 

Ibrahim Pasha, 30 
India, 50 
Ivan III., 4, 8 
Ivan IV., 4 

Japan, 56. 57 

Jentsch, 59. 60 

Jews, Russian, 12, 13 

Kiel!, 75 
Konieh, 31 
Krivosheine, 73 

Laharpe, 20 

Land Organization, Ministry of, 

72, 73 
Letts, 58 
Lithuania, 24 
Little Russia. 24 
Livonia, 24, 58 
London Protocol, 30 

German- Russians, 33, 36, 59, 05, 77 \ Louisa, Oneen of Prussia, 21 



Macedonia, 4". 47 • 
Mahmoud 11-, 31 
Mehemet-Ali, 30 
Mendeleyeff, 12 
Metternich, 30, 33 
Miller, Orest, 35 

Mir, 3 

Monarchy, 82, 83, 84, So 
Mongol yoke, 4, 14, 74 
Montenegro, 44, 46 
Moscow, 23, 45, 65, 76 
Moscow period, 4, 5, 34, 82 
Mussalmans, 71 

Napoleon, 2x, 22, 23 

Napoieon III., 42 

Navarino, 29 

Nesselrode, 28, 30 

Nicholas I., 25, 27-36. 40 

Nicholas II., 54, 81, S3 

Nicholas Mikhailovitch, Grand 
Duke, 20, 21 

Noblesse, the Russian, 8, g, 10, 11, 
16, 17. 19, 24, 25. 38. 39, 76, 77, 

North America, 38 

North Sea, 89 

Novgorod, 4 

Organic Laws of October, 1905, 70 
Orthodoxy, Russian, 39 
Oubril, d', 45 

Pahlen, 28 

Palaeologus, 4 

Pan-Germanism, 63, 64 

Panslavists, 30, 63, 64, 92 

Paul I., 20 

People's Tsar, 6, 8, 82, 86 

Peter III.. 15, 18 

Peter the Great, 3, 7-9, 11 

Petrograd, 7 

Poland, iS. 24, 57, 58, 77. 78, 79 

Poles, 18, 24, 39, 40, 77 

Pomerania, 15 

Porte, the, 30, 46 

Portsmouth, Peace of, 57 

Pourtal^s, 07 

Prussia, 15, 18, 21, 22, 24, 27, 28, 
32, 33, 41, 42, 48 

Quadruple Entente, 30 

Raskol, 8 

" Reform,' ' Peter the Great's, 7, 

8, 9. ir. 39, 79 
Roditch, 44 
Romanoffs, 6, 82 
Roumania, 46 
Russified Germans, ;i5 

Schleswig-Holstein, 31, 41 

Schwartzenberg, 75 

Sciences, Russian Academy of, 12 

Serbia, 30, 46, 74. 7^ 

Serbs, 32 

Senate, Russian, 8 

Siberia, 14. 73 

Slavdom, 36 

Slavic Peoples, 41, 77, 92 

Slavophils, 34. 35, (^3. T^. 77 

Slavs, 2, 3, 44, 76, 77. 88, 92 

S. Stefano, Treaty of, 47 

Stein, 22 

St. George's Day, 6 

Stolypin, 58, 59 

St. Petersburg, 11, 12, 15, 25, 29 

34, 42 
St. Petersburg period, 19, 39 
Strupp, '>i 
Sweden, 23, 89, 90 

Terek, 5 

Thessaly, 46 

Tourgheneff, 35 

Triple Entente. 29, 73, 74 

Tsar, 4. <J. 7. 83, 85, 86 

Turkey, 29, 30, 44, 46 

Turks, 18, 44 

United States, i, 38, 6r 
Unkiar Skelcssi, 31 


Varanger, princes, 3 
Vetche, 3 

Vienna Cabinet, 46 
Vienna Congress, 22 
Vistula, 21 
Vistulian region, 57 
Volga, 5 


V7allachia, 30 
Warsaw, Duchy of, 24 
William I., 42. 48 

Yayik, 5 

Zapadniki, 34 
Zemsky Sabers, 4 
Zemstvos, 38, 39 

Printed by C. & K. Laytom, London, E.C. 

M Wesselitsky, Gabriel de 

61 Russia & democracy